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SERVICE CHIEFS ON DEFENSE MISSION AND PRIORITIES

TASK FORCE ON DEFENSE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET UNITED STATES SENATE

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


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SERVICE CHIEFS ON DEFENSE MISSION AND PRIORITIES

Army Mission and Priorities

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1975

U.S. SENATE,
TASK FORCE ON DEFENSE,
COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET,
Washington, D.C.

The task force met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 357, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ernest F. Hollings presiding.

Present: Senators Hollings, Cranston, Bellmon, and Domenici.

Staff members present: Michael B. Joy, task force coordinator; Andrew Hamilton, professional staff.

Senator HOLLINGS. The committee will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HOLLINGS

Senator HOLLINGS. Today the Defense Task Force welcomes Gen. Fred C. Weyand, Chief of Staff of the Army, for a series of hearings on our national defense priorities. We have asked General Weyand for an overview of the Army, its role and mission, and how the Army budget is divided among them, how force requirements are established and what kind of Army we will need in the remaining years of the century.

There are many questions facing the Army and the Nation today which revolve around the concept of a Voluntary Army, will it work in a year when this country is not facing double-digit inflation and unemployment, and what section of our population is making up that Voluntary Force? I hope that the General will supply us with this information. I am sure that he will.

LOOKING FOR SAVINGS

General, we welcome you to the Budget Committee. We are looking for savings. When I say "savings," I mean what economies can be effected.

We really are privileged to have you. This committee has the greatest confidence in your leadership and we would like to hear from you at this time. I would like to hear where you are going to save. How are we going to come out if we continue the present course?

Where are we headed? Can this country afford all those pensions? Can it afford all those costs with the diminishing number of troops? Are they needed? I think we can count on you to give us a broader perspective as to exactly where we are headed rather than just the technicalities of just numbers and divisions and materiel and that kind of thing. However you wish to present it and make suggestions, we would appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF GEN. FRED C. WEYAND, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General WEYAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It may be that those answers will come out best in answering questions. I have a rather lengthy formal statement that I submitted to the committee and with your permission I would like to submit that for the record and then give a rather brief informal statement, which in a sense capsulizes that.

Senator HOLLINGS. Good. The statement in its entirety will be included in the record and you can summarize it as you wish.

[A biographical sketch and prepared statement of General Weyand follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN. FRED C. WEYAND, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General Fred C. Weyand was born in Arbuckle, California, 15 September 1916. He was commissioned a second lieutenant on graduation from the University of California and entered on active duty in December 1940. In World War II he served with various units in China, Burma, and India.

During the Korean conflict he served with the 3d Infantry Division in Japan and Korea.

During the 1950's he served in the Office of the Secretary of the Army; in West Berlin as Commanding Officer, 3d Battle Group, 6th Infantry; and as Chief of Legislative Liaison of the Department of the Army.

He commanded the 25th Infantry Division and II Field Force in South Vietnam, and later was Military Advisor to the Chairman, U.S. Delegation in the peace negotiations in Paris. He then returned to Vietnam as Deputy Commander and later Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

After withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Republic of Vietnam, he assumed command of the United States Army, Pacific. General Weyand became the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army in August 1973. On 7 October 1974 he was sworn in as Chief of Staff of the Army.

General Weyand has been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Silver Star, and numerous other U.S. and foreign decorations.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. FRED C. WEYLAND, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am delighted to be here to tell you about the Army's objectives, forces, and resource requirements.

Within the Department of Defense, the Army competes for resources in much the same way the Defense Department does with the President's Budget. It is a simple case of priorities.

We all know that the Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Department of Defense, as a part of the Executive Branch, share certain responsibilities for setting national priorities. Congress, representing the will of the American people, must be the ultimate arbiter in weighing the nation's competing demands for our limited resources. The task is complicated because we are working in a complex and uncertain environment, in a world made dangerous by escalating demands and dangers. The best course is not a clear one, and there are bound to be differences of opinion as to how this country can best allocate its resources.

My principal task in the determination of the Army's share of the allocation of these resources in the Defense Budget is to describe the need for a military capability strong enough to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad. I do this in what the Army calls its Five Year Program, which in this instance reflects the Army's objectives, forces, and resource requirements for FY 77-81. Shaping Army requirements in a five year program simplifies my task.

DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPING A 5-YEAR PROGRAM

Our five-year program is not put together overnight. Rather, it is developed each year in an evolutionary manner within a system disciplined by careful review and analysis by the Army Staff and major field commanders. Each new five-year program is a refinement of the old one, and its first year becomes the basis for the next annual budget.

The decisions made by the Army, the Defense Department, and the Congress on the five-year program and the budget are always subject to change. However, the decisions made at each successive level define the boundaries and constraints within which we must operate for several years. In other words, decisions that the Congress makes on current budgets and programs will establish constraints within which my successor and his successor will be forced to live. Conversely, I am now the Chief of Staff of an Army that was largely influenced by my two or three predecessors. This means that radical changes in the direction of Army programs are both slow and very difficult. Changes will continue to be incremental and evolutionary and, as they have been in the past, will be based on sound analyses. This continual review and refinement process makes me confident of both the austerity and the absolute need for the resources embodied in the current Army program. It provides the nation an Army capable of meeting its role in society and in defense.

ROLE OF THE ARMY

The Army has changed in recent years. However, our purpose remains unchanged. It exists to defend the United States and to protect our national interests. For years the role of U.S. military power has been an essential factor in world affairs, for military power makes credible and undergirds our foreign policy. Today, the primary role of military power is deterrence, but deterrence is not a substitute for defense. If deterrence is to be successful, military power must be visible so that equality of force is perceived by our friends as well as our potential adversaries. Following World War II, our country held an advantage over its potential enemies because of its dominance in nuclear weapons—nuclear power deterred major wars. Today, this advantage no longer exists. Military power and the perception of balance are measured more and more in terms of how well we will fight a conventional war. We must ensure retention of a nuclear balance, but we must recognize that conventional power is now necessary to deter war and that the Army is the principal element of this nation's conventional general purpose forces.

We cannot deter aggression by ourselves. We continue to work in partnership with our allies to form a cooperative deterrent. Our forces are deployed alongside the combat forces of our European allies in NATO as well as with the forces of South Korea. We provide materiel support and advice to other countries around the world such as Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia. These cooperative arrangements reflect mutual trust as well as satisfying mutual needs. The United States gives smaller or less powerful nations a choice. This choice produces stability, particularly in Europe and Korea where our most visible defense commitments are made. To reduce our dedication to these commitments would endanger the stability of mutual defense arrangements and even more importantly, would alter the military balance in those areas.

SOVIET THREAT

We do not see any reduction in the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact over the next several years. We speak to this threat each year, and I suspect that to some of you, it seems unnecessary. However, we must understand it. Historically, we have ignored reality in consistently underestimating our enemies. We have had to learn at immense cost and sacrifice that it

was our weakness, not our strength, which invited aggression. Most Americans have difficulty visualizing the Soviet threat. We are 3,000 miles from the potential battlefield. For instance, when I tell you that they have over four tanks to our one, it is a number—a number to be questioned and perhaps forgotten. To our allies and to our forces in Europe, that threat is real. They can see from their doorsteps the plains over which these tanks might advance.

MANPOWER INCREASE

The Soviet Union has increased the number of men in their armed forces from three to over four million since 1960. They continue to conscript for all of their forces with a universal military training period of two years for the Army. They have added 20 combat divisions since 1968. During the same period, the number of people in the United States Army has been halved so that their army land forces have about 2.5 million men, while ours have about 785,000. Their universal military training law requires refresher training for reservists, and their recently trained reserve strength approximates 4,000,000 men. In the past, the Soviet force has had a high "combat-to-support" ratio, emphasizing combat forces. They are now increasing support forces while we have been shifting somewhat in the other direction. After mobilization we now expect their combat-to-support ratio to be comparable to ours.

SUPPORT FORCES

In addition to tremendous tank strength, they have three artillery pieces to our one, and they have one-third more armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. They have a comparable advantage in less visible areas such as chemical warfare and air defense. The NATO Forces in Central and Northern Europe face a similar numerical imbalance in equipment when compared to the Warsaw Pact.


INCREASE IN SOVIET SPENDING

Although this situation disturbs me, I am equally worried by the danger implicit in recent trends. How large will the threat be in 1980? The Soviets now outspend us in defense by 20 percent. They spend 20-25 percent more on research and development and equipment than the United States. Their spending is reflected in the sophistication and proliferation of modern equipment that we now see in both the Soviet and their satellite armies. This equipment was extremely effective in the Arab-Israeli war. They not only have quantity but also quality. In past years we have relied heavily on our qualitative superiority to offset their numerical advantage. I am concerned that their increased spending in research and development may overcome what little qualitative advantage we now have. Viewed simply we see:

An increase in manpower.

An increase in defense expenditures.

An increase in combat-ready divisions. They are better equipped. They are well-manned. With their resource commitment to defense, we can expect to see this trend continue.



SOVIET IDEOLOGY—AGGRESSIVE

In spite of detente, Soviet ideology tends to be aggressive. The Warsaw Pact forces are far more than needed for self defense, a point made obvious from the information which I mentioned. During the last Mid-East War, the Soviet Union demonstrated impressive improvements in their ability to move large quantities of materiel. This enhanced mobility indicates a potential for the Soviet Union as a worldwide military power rather than one that is simply predominant in its area. Therefore, if military balance is to be maintained, the United States and its allies must retain strong conventional forces, and they must be well equipped and trained. The United States must play a lead role in building this force, for we are the only non-Communist country that can provide the nucleus around which such cooperative deterrence can be built.

ARMY'S ROLE INCREASING

The Army's role in equipping and training our friends and allies is increasing. Military assistance to our friends is a necessary and legitimate element of national security. It is in our national interest to assist them in attaining self-sufficiency, at least to the extent that they can defend against the most likely threat to their survival. These nations turn to us for their security needs even though they could buy from us—and receive it in much less time. The reason they come to us is because they trust us. That trust is an offering that we should not reject without very careful thought.

VOLUNTEER FORCE

Since dedicating itself to creating and maintaining an all-volunteer force, the Army has succeeded in capitalizing on the volunteer concept to create a highly motivated, professional Army. It is an Army young in spirit but increasingly well grounded in fundamentals. It seeks to establish a set of solid, personal values in the almost 200,000 young men and women who pass through it each year, carrying training in trades back to their civilian communities.

WAY OF LIFE

In the Army, soldiers and their dependents are fully integrated into a total community, a community providing a living environment in which a soldier's camaraderie and commitment to other soldiers, his unit and the Army develops. To foster and sustain such commitment, the Army is and must remain a way of life, not simply a place to work.

ADEQUATE FUNDS NEEDED

With this concept in mind, we must continue to emphasize those elements of our recruiting and retention system that have been successful. Any refinements that we apply to those elements must be made with full knowledge of the fragile nature of the Volunteer Force. We do not know what the full effect may be of decreasing such funds as those that support recruiter quality, good training, junior enlisted entitlements, educational and morale enhancing benefits. We do know that elements like these have enabled us to succeed in reaching a volunteer Army. But the volunteer Army has not matured. We must resist tinkering so soon with the apparatus that has led to our success.

The always attractive prospect of immediate cost savings could well lead to higher long-range costs in terms of lower quality recruits, increased losses of quality personnel, lowered unit readiness, and poorly trained soldiers.

We will continue to recruit the required quantity and quality of people to man this young, vigorous force. But to do this, we will require adequate fiscal support for our programs.

A BALANCE BETWEEN FORCE SIZE AND RISK

If we are to acquire, train, and equip a force capable of defending the United States and protecting national interests, we require some definition as to where our national interests lie and how best to protect this country. These decisions have been made by a government which sees its interests tied closely with the defense of NATO, particularly Western Europe.

CAPABLE FORCE

The Army must be responsive, however, to any commitment directed by the President or the Congress. We must be prepared for the unexpected. We must have flexibility and versatility. We need different types of units—airborne, air-mobile, mechanized, armor, and infantry. In short, we must have a force capable of meeting a wide spectrum of contingencies.

We determine what units we need in the Army by the job we have to do. Since our job is defense, we consider the size of the potential enemy and his capabilities, together with his strategies and tactics. The Secretary of Defense provides guidance and a wartime scenario for use in making this determination. The scenario outlines an assumed sequence of events that we could reasonably expect to follow in a contingency situation. We first assume a crisis situation

where we would be directed to move a small force to a trouble spot outside of NATO. Next, we assume that this action would be followed by mobilization and movement of the majority of our combat forces to Western Europe to defend against a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces. This is the most demanding set of circumstances that we are prepared to face. The force derived to fight in NATO must also be capable of meeting coincidentally less demanding requirements elsewhere in the world.

SMALLER ARMY AND INCREASED RISKS

Continual analyses, coupled with the judgment of our major commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicate that about 30 Army divisions are required in such a scenario, if we are to enjoy a low-risk of failure in meeting such wartime commitments and contingencies. Such a force has not been deemed practical in an era of constrained resources. We have accepted a smaller Army and increased risks.

USCINCEUR stated requirement in the event of armed aggression in Central Europe exceeds 20 US Army divisions. Our war games analyses and studies support a requirement for more than 20 US Army divisions in Europe. We judged the 21-division force which formed the backbone of the Army last year marginally capable of meeting this requirement and the threat perceived at that time. The adequacy of that force would have been placed in jeopardy if:

Our threat assessments were inaccurate.

Army forces were involved elsewhere in the world.

Warsaw Pact mobilization went undetected.

The means to move our forces to Europe were not available as planned or losses during ocean crossing exceeded projections.

In these areas of considerable uncertainty, there was little or no margin for error. Since that time, the threat has grown. It was against that backdrop of high risk that we began taking initiatives to improve our combat capability. The three additional divisions activated this year reduce the risk to a more prudent level and provide a force better able to meet the critical requirements of a major war.

THE PROGRAMED FORCE

We have in our program for the next five years a force of 24 divisions, 16 active and 8 Reserve Components. The program shows an average strength of about 785,000 for the active Army. We are working at this point to develop the reserve force into a solid structure that rounds out our active forces.

We will have completed expansion of our combat divisions to 24 by end fiscal Year 77 without increasing overall strength. This was made possible by conversion of support units to combat, elimination and/or reduction of headquarters, and other management actions. We will continue to move toward an appropriately balanced combat-to-support ratio of forces.

The 24-division force is flexible. It can respond to a wide range of potential problems while maintaining adequate forces to respond to a European conflict. We must be able to do this because brush-fire type contingencies outside of NATO are more likely than a NATO/Warsaw Pact confrontation in Europe, and they become more likely in the context of such a confrontation. One only has to look at Korea, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam for recent examples.

We continually study and update our plans for maintaining our forward deployment in NATO. We plan to move our forces so that with our NATO Allies, we will have a favorable balance of force on the ground. Our forces will be heavy in combat and austere in support in the early days of the war. As the war goes on our support forces will build up to provide needed staying power to the combat elements. However, as we have increased the number of combat units, we have necessarily reduced the active Army's ability to support its own combat forces. We cannot maintain the desired level of combat forces and a matching level of support forces within existing active duty manpower authorizations. Accordingly, reliance on early mobilization and commitment of reserve support units in event of a major confrontation in NATO is essential. The risk involved is acceptable in order to increase much needed early, combat capability.

Because of the terrain and enemy threat, the European theater favors a preponderance of mechanized and armored forces. Equipment availability and existing procurement programs initially led to the organization of two of the three new divisions as infantry. Our next five year program is likely to show the

eventual conversion of some of our infantry units to a mechanized configuration as equipment becomes available.

We will pursue full integration of active and Reserve Component units. The primary method for doing this is through an affiliation concept where Reserve units are affiliated with an active unit sponsor. The active unit assists and supervises training of the reserve unit, and where possible, the reserve unit trains with its active counterpart. At end FY75 we had 26 Reserve Component battalions affiliated with active units. We will expand this to 96 by end FY76. We will affiliate a Reserve Component brigade with each of the new divisions to make them three-brigade divisions. We are increasing the distribution of modern equipment to these units and improving their readiness through higher manning and better training.

MAJOR THRUST OF INVESTMENT PROGRAM

The major thrust of our investment program is to improve the war fighting capability of the Army.

We will increase delivery of modern equipment to the Reserve Components.

We plan to reconstitute our war reserves and stockpiles in Europe.

Between now and 1981, we will introduce several new weapons systems including a new tank, a new armored personnel carrier, two new helicopters and significantly improved command, control and communications systems.

We will continue a vigorous research and development program.

READINESS IMPERATIVE

In peacetime the Army's first mission is deterrence; its first imperative is readiness—readiness of units, people and equipment. The readiness of the force is all important. During the budget review process, the Congress has the means to set whatever force level it believes adequate. However, the forces authorized the Army must be accompanied by the resources needed to equip and train it to fight. The active Army, including selected Reserve Component units, must be 100% ready to fight immediately. The bulk of the Reserve Components will follow the active forces to war. Affiliation, equipment modernization, and equipment distribution will improve the readiness of the Reserve Components. Even so, these units cannot provide effective substitutes for active forces in the opening days of the conflict. Realistic response times for contingency operations simply cannot allow it. A more ready reserve is an essential augmentation for an active Army but it cannot be a substitute. As in all other things, you get what you pay for. The solution is to strike a proper balance between active and reserve forces. The objectives of our improved reserve affiliation program and the emphasis on combat forces in the active Army will result in about the right proportion of reserve to active forces. We cannot afford a higher risk than we currently realize with the national security.

COMBAT READINESS

The Foreign Military Sales program continues its high potential for return on our security investment and for improvement of the combat readiness of our allies, other friendly forces and U.S. forces. Foreign military sales are an essential part of cooperative deterrence, but we do not currently have the necessary legal basis and funds to meet this important commitment. For example, the DOD request for an Inventory Replenishment Fund in FY76 was not favorably considered by the Authorization Committees of the two Houses. As a result the needs of our allies and friends cannot be considered in our procurement and production plans. When approval is eventually given for sales or grants, often in a crisis situation, the equipment may have to be withdrawn or diverted from the active or reserve forces. The combat readiness of the Army is degraded by such actions. Considering the importance of a high state of combat readiness to the security of the nation, we believe it is necessary that Congress provide us the mechanism for responsive support to our allies and friends without degrading Army combat readiness.

We continue to need a stand-by reserve force, but we also need a stand-by draft so that replacement personnel will be made available rapidly in the event of war. Notwithstanding the success to date of the volunteer force concept, the Army, the Department of Defense, and the Congress must take a hard look at

what would happen during a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact after our 24 divisions are committed to combat. Early decisions, such as total mobilization, would be required.

BUDGET EXPERIENCE

Combat readiness has not been an easy objective to achieve. Each year the Army submits its budget request to the Congress as part of the President's budget. By the time the Army submits this request, it has thoroughly scrubbed its requirements. Many hard choices have been made as we weeded out lower priority requirements in order to do those things that we must do. Yet our budget requests are reduced from \$1-2 billion each year by the time the money is appropriated. We are not naive enough to believe that we will get everything that we request. We hope that the Congress will consider the long term impact of its cuts and take into consideration decisions made by the executive branch prior to submission.

Many reductions have serious long term impacts. Reductions in operating money for equipment and facility maintenance may, on the surface, appear to provide savings. In the long run, we must repair our facilities; we must get our equipment out of the maintenance shops, and a delay simply increases the cost of such work and reduces our readiness.

5-YEAR PROCUREMENT PROGRAM IS ESSENTIAL

We now have a program equipment inventory objective of approximately \$43 billion. With the FY76 requested procurement, the value of the assets against this objective is estimated to be \$27 billion. This equipment shortfall translates to (1) significant shortages of standard equipment to outfit and support the force structure, particularly in the Reserve Components and (2) a minimal capability to sustain the forces in the event of war. With minor exception, 13 of 16 active Army divisions are equipped and could go to war today if required. Our objective is to have the three additional divisions combat ready by end FY77. The Reserve Components as a whole, however, are operating with significant shortages of equipment and in many cases with equipment that is sub-standard. For example: 63% of the Reserve Component tank battalions are equipped with the 90mm, M48 tank; none of the Reserve Component Infantry units have the TOW and Dragon anti-tank missile systems; the only division level air defense capability is the Korean war vintage M42 40mm "Duster". The Army's five year procurement program is designed to correct these deficiencies, modernize the entire force as much as resources will permit, and build the essential war reserve stocks to sustain the force in combat if required. Congressional support of these critical investment programs is essential.

STABILITY NEEDED

The Army needs stability in its military end strength. Our program does not require more military manpower than we have but we hope to get Congressional support to hold the line at an end strength of 785,000 for FY76. Stability permits continuation of management efficiencies as we increase our combat-to-support ratio; improvement in recruiting and training programs with the steady personnel policies that stability fosters; and improvement in combat readiness as personnel turbulence is reduced and soldiers are in units for training.

Gentlemen, I will be happy to have your questions.

General WEYAND. That formal statement, sir, treats the dynamics of developing a 5-year program, the role of the Army, the threat, our experience with the Voluntary Force that you commented upon, the balance between force and risk, the programmed force for the Army of today, imperative of readiness and our budget experience, and, finally, it comments on our need for stability.

SIZE OF PRESENT ARMY

Today the Army is the smallest army that we have had in 25 years. It is 785,000 men and women. It has 13 active divisions, 8 National

Guard divisions, and we are in the process of forming 3 additional composite divisions made up of active and reserve units. Those divisions are to be formed over the next 2 years.

The Army's share of the Federal budget is about 7 percent, and that is the smallest that it has been in some 35 years. But even so, this Army is a professional, disciplined force with all 13 of its fully activated divisions operationally ready. It is a first-class army and I think, as you would guess, I am proud of it.

MISSION

Its mission has remained unchanged at least in our time. It is to insure the survival of this Nation and our way of life. A second and in recent times more heightened mission in terms of importance is to deter conflict or attacks that would jeopardize our national interests.

This Army was organized a year before the country formally declared its independence, so it was present at the birth of this Nation and in those intervening 200 years it has been directly involved in the development and in the progress that we have made as a Nation. It has been used wisely at times and it has been used poorly at times, but it has never failed to accomplish its mission and that, too, we are proud of.

Now that mission derives from a foreign policy that has remained relatively unchanged for many years. In July of this year, the Secretary of State described our foreign policy as one of shaping a new international structure based upon equilibrium rather than confrontation.

FOUR SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

Now from that very broad policy statement, he derived some four specific objectives and admittedly they are somewhat broad, too. They are to maintain our military strengths and our control of nuclear weapons and to transform our alliances into equal partnerships, to stabilize relations with Communist powers, and to increase our cooperation with the developing world.

So looking at it from a military standpoint, we find that in that policy or those policy statements a continued advocacy of equilibrium through balanced military strength. By "balanced" I mean vis-a-vis our potential adversaries, and collective security through partnership with other nations and, finally, stabilized relations through negotiations with our potential adversaries with our position being one of negotiating from a position of relative strength.

Now with respect to these foreign policy elements of partnership and negotiation, to be a credible element of foreign policy our military strength must be visible and our resolve must, of course, be unmistakable. I mention this because credible strength derived from our foreign policy is the policy basis for our forward deployments of Army units in Western Europe and in Northeast Asia. It is also the policy basis for our efforts to attain a very high state of readiness for the Army as opposed to, say, the mobilization type of Army that we have had in times past.

PARTNERSHIP

With respect to partnership, to be meaningful we must recognize with respect to other nations that their national interests and their legitimate concerns for their national security are real. Now these are concerns that many Americans find difficult to evaluate because, contrary to many of our allies, we do not have a potential enemy or hostile force as a threat on our immediate borders.

NEGOTIATIONS

Finally, with respect to the negotiations element of our foreign policy, which, of course, is the genesis for détente, the Army plays an important part by providing a substantive nonbelligerent force that undergirds our negotiating stance.

MANPOWER STRENGTH AND UNIT STRUCTURE

Now, the Army's manpower strength and its unit structure, that is, the number of divisions that it has and the types of divisions that it has, are the result of a number of things, as you know: Threat analyses; national security policy, as enumerated by the President's National Security Council; and then I receive more specific guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff; then there are stated requirements from our Unified Commanders in Europe, in South America, in the Pacific and Asia; there are war games and studies; and, finally, the specific directives, the guidance that we received from the Congress.

PRODUCT OF EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

All of those inputs shape our strength and our unit structure. This Army of today is a product of evolutionary change. Although it is dramatically different from the Army of, say, 10 years ago—and I won't go into detail here—but the elements of readiness, of the amount of armor and mechanized units we have, our antitank capability, our strategic reach, our firepower, the discipline of the Army, its professionalism, and its capacity for combined arms in joint combat action, all of those things have been heightened in the Army of today.

FLEXIBLE ORGANIZATION

Briefly, the Active Army has four divisions in Europe, one division in Northeast Asia, a division in the Pacific in reserve, and seven operationally ready divisions here in the continental limits of the United States. They are for reinforcement in Europe and for contingency actions. It is an organization that is deliberately structured to have great flexibility and to provide a variety of options for utilization.

I know that the Army is many things to many people. But basically, I keep reminding myself that its purpose is to fight.

READINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS

Our greatest successes in recent times, in my opinion, have been the high degree of readiness that has been attained by our major combat units and by the effectiveness of this Voluntary Force program.

Our greatest shortcomings are personnel turbulence, equipment shortages, and the fragility of this Voluntary Force program. Those programs, which have been our greatest successes, also are very vulnerable to congressional support, to public attitudes with respect to our Government and the military. They are vulnerable, as you implied, to the economic situation and to unemployment. They are vulnerable, too, to our ability in the Army to provide opportunities for challenge and satisfying achievements for these young men and women that come into the Army.

Mr. Chairman, I will be happy now to take your questions.

TROOPS AND DEPENDENTS

Senator HOLLINGS. With respect to your opening remarks, General Weyand, what do we have, a couple of hundred thousand troops and dependents over there?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

ONE- AND TWO-YEAR TOURS

Senator HOLLINGS. With respect to dependents, if I am assigned to Korea, I don't take my family; if I am assigned to Heidelberg, I take my family? One is a 2-year tour of duty and the other is a 1-year?

General WEYAND. A soldier who is authorized to take his family to Germany normally has a 3-year tour of duty. The unaccompanied tour for Korea is at present 13 months.

ONE-YEAR APPROACH IN EUROPE

Senator HOLLINGS. You have said in your answer to the question on Korea that you are ready under the 1-year approach, could that be employed economically now in Europe? There is always an amendment with respect to savings on troops in Europe. Let's agree they are going to be a strong basic force, whether it is 100,000 or 200,000. Let's say we keep the present combat force readiness of a couple of hundred thousand troops, could there be an economy in using the Korean approach of 1-year assignment without family in Europe?

General WEYAND. Well, sir, we would like to do that wherever we can. We would prefer, of course, from a pure combat aspect to have our troops there without their dependents. However, we have studied and restudied the issue of having our troops in Europe for a year or some short tour less than the period they now serve and have them there without dependents. We have found that the cost of the constant rotation of those troops between Europe and here are prohibitive. Also, we have proven in past attempts when we have been made to do this, that the morale factor is adverse and the readiness declines markedly.

You may recall that beginning about 1950 this issue of rotating troops to Europe was very much a matter of concern to all of us. We

attempted one experiment which involved gyroscoping or rotating entire divisions. That proved to be unsatisfactory. We tried it with brigades and regiments and, finally, companies.

ANOTHER ATTEMPT

Now we have come full cycle, and we have sent to Europe one brigade and will send another. These are an outgrowth of the Nunn amendment whereby we have increased our combat troops in Europe and decreased the support-type troops without increasing the total numbers.

Now those two sizable units are over there without dependents. We will see how that comes out in terms of cost and in terms of the morale of our men, which, of course, is a factor in readiness.

LENGTH OF TERM

Senator HOLLINGS. During our visitations we see the situation from the housing standpoint and from the local friction standpoint. We would immediately acknowledge in the context of any troops around our own homeland that they would be an irritant. I assume the U.S. Army troops in Europe are not walking up the main streets of Cologne or Frankfurt in uniform. On the contrary I think they have a low visibility. Those are the kinds of things that go through a Senator's mind with respect not only to the economy, but the better judgment regarding American presence there.

You are going to have now, you say, two brigades that are going to be without dependents. Will they be on a shorter term or on a 3-year term also?

General WEYAND. They are on a shorter term.

Senator HOLLINGS. Of what, 1 year?

General WEYAND. Six months.

MORALE PROBLEM

Senator HOLLINGS. So you are trying to see how it is. Finding a place for a sergeant and his wife to stay is almost prohibitive in Frankfurt. The costs and everything else we see causes a heck of a morale problem.

SITUATION IMPROVED

General WEYAND. It does. I think, as you know, that situation has improved significantly in the last 2 years. A lot of the specific deficiencies and shortcomings, such as housing, are alleviated in the minds of our people by other positive advantages that they find in Europe. They are welcome over there. The German people by and large want them there. Their readiness, their knowledge that they can perform their mission, which is different than it was 3 or 4 or 5 years ago, are the things that motivate soldiers. The end result of all of this has been that Europe and our Army in Europe is a much more desirable place in the eyes of our noncommissioned officers and our junior officers than it ever has been.

So, in total, although there are shortcomings there, the situation has continued to improve to the point where almost everyone who goes to Europe now, I find, comments favorably upon it, including the Members of the Congress.

COST

Now, as for the cost of it, our balance of payments over there has shifted to the point where it is in balance, if not somewhat favorable to us. That has been a matter of very deep concern to all of us, to face the difficulties which you have mentioned as well as to be paying exorbitant amounts of money to be there. But, as I say, those changes have been quite significant.

We have an Army over there that is capable. Its morale is high. We have officers and men volunteering to go to Europe. We have many of them asking for extensions over there, and these are all actions that we didn't see 2 or 3 years ago.

OVERALL COST

Senator HOLLINGS. What is the overall cost of troops in Europe?

General WEYAND. Sir, I would have to furnish that for the record. The net cost, I don't know, except that we found in general that it is as costly to keep them in the United States as it would be to maintain them in Europe. That is a general statement, however; if you don't mind, I will furnish you the specifics on that.

Senator HOLLINGS. We would appreciate that and then we would be able to explore it a little bit more.

[The following information was subsequently supplied for the record:]

The fiscal year 1976 costs of maintaining the U.S. Army's forces in Europe are estimated at \$5.3 billion. These include both on-the-ground costs, and costs for overwater shipping and CONUS support.

NUMBER OF HEADQUARTERS

Senator HOLLINGS. I know the headquarters are attractive over there. We have heard the statement to the effect that we have as many generals over there now as we had when we took the place.

How many headquarters are there and are those all necessary?

SUBSTANTIAL CUT

General WEYAND. In the last 2 years we have cut and inactivated a number of those headquarters, intermediate ones. I believe it is something like three or four. Those that we have we have cut markedly in strength. We have reached a point, I believe, where combining headquarters has reached its limit. For example, at the corps level, that is at our tactical level, the corps commander, who in the old days used to be concerned just with tactics and the operational employments of his troops, now is responsible for their logistics support and their community support as well.

So we have done a lot of that and those savings have been cranked into our combat structure. This has been one of the main reasons why today I am able to tell you that the Army is capable of accomplishing its mission. We weren't able to state that 2 or 3 or 4 years ago.

HEADQUARTERS ELIMINATED

Senator HOLLINGS. Which headquarters have been eliminated or combined?

General WEYAND. A logistics headquarters, a theater logistics headquarters, and the 7th Army Headquarters were eliminated. Also, there was an engineer headquarters that was eliminated.

GENERAL OFFICERS CUT

We have looked at the possibility of doing something about the corps headquarters, but it turns out that is not a wise thing to do, either for peace or for war. So this is a program that has been going on throughout the Army. We have inactivated in the last year and a half some seven major headquarters. We have cut our general officer strength by some 40 or 50 general officers over the past 2 years.

We do have some six full generals who are within the Army. We have four others, full generals, who are outside the Army in unified commands and the like.

Senator HOLLINGS. Let me yield at this point to Senator Cranston. I know he has some questions and I will resume later.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

TURBULENCE—BIG PROBLEM

You said in your opening remarks that one of the Army's biggest problems is "turbulence." What did you mean by the use of that word?

END-STRENGTH FLUCTUATIONS

General WEYAND. Well, it is the fluctuations in our end-strength. We need to look at turbulence that is caused by outside pressures. An example would be in 1972, I believe it was, where in midyear the Army was directed to cut its man-year strength by 70,000 men. That required the Army to displace from the Army's ranks some 130,000 men so that the man-year requirement would be met. It resulted in the reduction in force of several thousand officers.

LOWER RANKING MEN RELEASED FASTER

It took out of our force a great many of the men down at the grass-roots that really provided the combat readiness at the unit level because, unfortunately, it is the lower-ranking men that can be released more quickly. So that is a type of turbulence that has made it impossible for us to manage the Army effectively or to attain the state of readiness that we really should be able to give this country for the money that is spent and for the resources that we have in terms of men.

END STRENGTH FOR ARMY

Following that experience, and we have had other experiences like it before, we did a plea to the administration and to the Congress to settle on an end strength for the Army and permit us then within that end strength to see if we couldn't manage the Army more effectively and generate greater combat power from it.

MORE STABLE FORCE

We were granted that request and for the last 2 years we have had an end strength of 785,000. During that time, by what we consider to be improved management efficiency, we have converted some 42,000 spaces from support, headquarters units, and the like into pure combat units. We have been able to stabilize our force so that promotion policies and assignment policies internally are more stable.

As soon as we get turbulence of the type I have mentioned, then we find that we are sending men in and out of assignments in a year and a half as opposed to being able to leave them in their positions for 2 and 3 years.

Now the Volunteer Army gives us a great opportunity to tamp down some of this turbulence that came from the draft type of army where, as you recall, every man came in for 2 years. He was trained for 6 months and that left us with something less than a year and half of service in units.

LONGER ENLISTMENTS

As you know, we have terminated 2-year enlistments as of last June, so all of the men and women in the Army come in for 3 years and quite a percentage of them for 4 years. You can imagine what this does for us in terms of professionalism and all because we have a more stable force. I am convinced that we can have a better Army, and I think we have demonstrated that with fewer people we can maintain the stable force.

There are just all sorts of things that it enables us to do. Maybe part of this turbulence is a state of mind. You take these violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act, which we find all too often. I think we are able to get to that problem because now I can use my audit agencies to do the thing that they were meant to do, and that is to get into financial and resource accounting and management, as opposed to having them inspecting units for readiness and the like.

In any event, sir, there is turbulence of all kinds, and we pay a very high price for it.

COST OF VOLUNTEER V. NONVOLUNTEER ARMY

Senator CRANSTON. Have you calculated in terms of cost alone and no other factor what you would currently estimate as the cost of the Volunteer Army versus the nonvolunteer Army? Have you taken into account the higher pay and so forth and so on?

COST ESTIMATE

General WEYAND. Yes, sir. We have done a cost estimate on that. I don't give it to you with any high degree of confidence. We believe that the annual net cost is \$100 million. Without getting to the increased salaries that you spoke about, we find that the costs are about \$260 million, which includes things such as recruiting and advertising, that is our recruiting force, the bonuses, and special pay and special programs such as civilianization of KP and things like that. Offsetting that is approximately \$160 million we saved from the cost of training in the high turnover environment of the draft. In other words, our training base became smaller.

So that is how we get the net of \$100 million.

PAY RAISE

Now about the pay. If we include the comparability pay raise of 1971, that brings the cost of that up to \$1.2 billion. The comparability pay raise in 1971 was \$1.1 billion expressed in fiscal year 1976 dollar values. Now I know that many people will differ with me, but I maintain that is not a cost of the volunteer program. That pay raise was put into effect by the Congress to bring, particularly our junior people, enlisted men and officers, up to what was considered a comparable pay level with their civilian counterparts, if there is such a thing.

Senator CRANSTON. Your point is that that would have happened even if we did not have a volunteer army?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir. To be realistic, I don't see how this country could be drafting men now with all the inequities that are involved in that and pay them \$80 or \$90 a month. I certainly can't. I think we would be paying those young men \$361 or something like it that they receive now.

FRAGILITY OF VOLUNTEER ARMY

Senator CRANSTON. I think that is a very good point you make there. You referred to the "fragility" of the volunteer army. What did you mean by that?

UNMATURED PROGRAMS

General WEYAND. I meant, sir, that the programs that we have in effect now were arrived at through only the experience of a year or 2 years. They have not matured. To put it another way, you recall that we tried many programs. There was beer in the barracks and the slogan "The Army wants to join you"; the move toward permissiveness that in some way we had to please this young man or woman to get them to come into the Army.

NEW PROGRAMS

Those kinds of programs went by the wayside. In dealing with these young men and women, we found out that when they came in the Army, they expected challenge, and when they weren't challenged physically or mentally, they were disappointed and dissatisfied.

PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CHALLENGE

So we began a program of very intense physical training in their opening weeks and of mental challenge. Now we have to get into the military, almost one out of three of the young men who are qualified in this country each year for military service. I would say one out of three or one out of four, depending on which assessment you read. That is a very formidable challenge for a service like the Army.

UNIT OF CHOICE

We know that the caliber of our recruiting force of those young men out there, captains down to sergeants, and of our advertising programs are terribly important to us. Take the unit-of-choice recruiting, for example. When we started this program and found we had difficulty getting the numbers of young men into the Army that we needed, we permitted our units like the 82d Airborne, the 2d Armored Division—Patton's division—and all our old-line outfits to take some of their men, go back to their own communities and recruit for the Army for a period of time. The unit representative would go back for 2 weeks to a month, and we would guarantee the recruit obtained by this means that he could stay with that unit for 16 months.

This program is based upon pride and heritage of the unit and being able to talk eyeball to eyeball with a man who had served in it. You don't get all these phony contracts as we used to when recruiters were trying to make numbers. There was a validity to the unit-of-choice program that we liked and it proved out.

Now that program has just or is on the verge of being canceled out by congressional action. I am not here to make a plea for that particular program, because it is just one part; but I think it is obvious to us that, as the chairman mentioned with the unemployment and the economic situation, when we do have full employment will young men and women be as attracted to the Army?

INCENTIVE PROGRAMS NEEDED

We think that they will, but as we have experimented with these various programs, I have to tell you that we are not certain just how we are going to do that. We need, I think, about another year of experience with our recruiting force and with these programs of incentives to then give us some assurance that we can attract not only the numbers, but, most importantly, quality.

We are getting quality young men and women into the Army now, far higher than we had during the draft years.

Senator HOLLINGS. How do you measure that? That is interesting.

General WEYAND. We measure by our discipline and all of the other normal measurements that we have used through the years.

HIGHER CALIBER

Senator HOLLINGS. With this in mind, pardon me for interrupting, but they say that this voluntary army was an over-reaction. During Vietnam it was being fought by the black, the poor and the disadvan-

tagged, the casualty figures showed it. In order to be certain that did not happen, we instituted the Volunteer Army and now we find out that it is made up of just that, the black, the poor, the disadvantaged.

Now contrast that in the context of your telling us it is higher caliber.

General WEYAND. It is higher caliber by all the measures of absent without leave, desertions, courts-martial, rapes, malingerings, and so forth. It is a better one than we have ever had in that respect. With respect to blacks, we consider that a success story in that the Army is perceived by blacks as an equal opportunity institution for them.

Now we still have problems. I am not trying to state that we do not, but among blacks it is perceived that way and I am proud of that. Now I think the fears that the Army would become all black, I hope that those are behind us, because we certainly have enough experience to be able to put that to rest.

The numbers of blacks that are attracted to the Army now are running about 22 to 23 percent a month, and I do not consider that out of line. I would have to get the figures of how many go out as we rotate. I think the black content in the Army, however, while it may increase somewhat is not going to be a matter or should not be a matter of concern to any American citizen.

RECRUIT BACKGROUND DATA

Now about the economic level of our volunteers and the types of homes they come from, I would rather not generalize about that. I would be happy to submit something for the record.

[The following was subsequently submitted for the record:]

Data on the economic status of a recruit's family are not routinely collected. A recently conducted Army-wide survey, however, containing data as of November 1974, asked personnel of all grades "What was the approximate income of the family in which you grew up, at the time you entered the Army?" Survey results for enlisted personnel in grade E-1, the volunteers most recently entering the Army, are shown in the table presented below as compared with family incomes for U.S. society as a whole.

[In percent]

Family income (yearly)	Soldiers (E-1) ¹	U.S. families ²
\$5 000 or less	22.6	21.1
\$5 000 to \$10 000	31.7	23.6
\$10 000 to \$15 000	26.3	22.1
\$15 000 to \$20 000	14.1	23.7
\$15 000 to \$25 000 ³	5.3	9.5
Over \$20 000		
Over \$25 000 ³		

¹ Army personnel composited: DAPC-PMP Report No. 3-75-S Nov. 30, 1974.

² Household money income in 1974, U.S. Department of Commerce series P-60, No. 100, August 1975.

³ Variances caused by different income distribution range used in referenced documents.

The survey results for the types of community from which these same volunteers entered the Army are shown in the following table.

Type of community in which most of life was spent :	Soldiers (E-1) ¹ (percent)
Rural, small town, or village (under 500 population)	16.2
Town (500 to 25,000 population)	30.4
Small city or suburb (25,000 to 100,000 population)	31.8
Large city (over 100,000 population)	21.6

¹ Army Personnel Composit : DAPC-PMP Report #3-75-S, Nov. 30, 1974.

Finally, I find that in going around and visiting my commanders that they are unanimous in telling me that these young men and women who are getting into the Army are the finest young men and women that they have ever received. They pose a real challenge for our young leaders, because the Army is built from the ground up. This is something else the Volunteer force forced upon us, and it has been a healthy thing. You know we try to do so many things from Washington that we are not capable of doing—I do not mean the Congress, I am talking about the Army. You ask the question of who is it that can attract the young man or woman into the Army? Once you get them in, who is it that can motivate them to do their best and inspire them in enough numbers to want to stay in the Army? Well it is not a general, it is not a colonel, it is going to be a sergeant or a lieutenant or a captain. Those are the people that are telling me that these are fine young men and women they are getting into the Army.

I said that those young people are providing a challenge for those junior leaders and they are.

WILL MODERN ARMY FIGHT?

Senator HOLLINGS. Without identifying or necessarily agreeing, you have some old retired general friends who say, "I am worried. I do not believe that Army will fight. I would hate to have to lead that Army." What is your comment?

General WEYAND. Well, it is that old business, you know, the older you get you look back on the Army as that wonderful, well-disciplined, clean-cut, professional Army. But I tell you if you sit still for a minute and think back on it, it was not all that great for any of us. I know that some people feel that way but almost always it is just a misconception of what the Army is today. It is lack of knowledge about it. For example, not too long ago I met with our retired four-star generals, because I have found that they wrestled with many of the same basic problems—Reserve component readiness, equipment shortages, turbulence, rotation of units to Europe, and so forth—that I am troubled with.

So their advice could be of assistance to me. I have found, as you said, some concern about this modern Army and whether or not it would fight? When we got down to just giving them the straight word without trying to embellish it, every one of those officers left there, I would say, satisfied and reassured. Because if it has to, and I hope it does not, this Army will fight.

COMMISSARIES

Senator HOLLINGS. Excuse me, Alan, but finally General Weyand, on the matter of costs of the Volunteer Army, are there any emoluments, benefits that could be eliminated? What is your position on the commissaries or any other benefits that we might now economize on?

General WEYAND. No, sir. I am not here to offer up any of those.

Senator HOLLINGS. I have to say what General Weyand said, you know that. We had the big Chief of Staff up there and what was his position on commissaries?

General WEYAND. Well, the administration has a position on commissaries and I think that is in the record and I am not going to oppose that in public.

PENSION AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS

Senator HOLLINGS. How about the pension and the retirement benefits and so forth. It seems to us that the paying out ends are adequate, are they more than adequate, would there be any economizing there?

Some say they are going into the billions projected for the military retirement by the year 2000: can the country afford that?

General WEYAND. There is no question in my mind that the country can afford it, but I agree with you those are very, very large figures we are talking about. I simply do not know, looking ahead, what is to be done about that.

COST CUTS ATTEMPTED

With respect to the things that are within my budget, we have attempted to cut costs. We have cut back bonus payments. Unfortunately, we still find that we need bonus payments to get the kinds of men that we need into the hard skills and the difficult less-desirable jobs in the Army. A case in point of what we are all struggling with is our permanent changes-in-station moves. We cut those by something well over 100,000 moves a year, from over 800,000 moves in a year to slightly below 700,000, and yet the costs, the absolute costs to the Army and to the people of this country, have increased.

LOOKING FOR SAVINGS

So as we try to keep within the budget and give this country the kind of Army it needs, we are looking for savings; but I am not looking for them in commissaries or the benefits that have already been provided the men. I think those kinds of savings are small, certainly small in relation to the benefits and the advantages in terms of satisfaction and welfare of my people.

NEED FOR COMMISSARIES

You take commissaries, for example, there is a great feeling, and understandably so, that you do not need commissaries around urban areas. The regulation provides that under certain circumstances you can have a commissary around urban areas, and I hope that we have stuck within the provisions of the regulation. But, a major, a captain, or a sergeant stationed in Washington needs that commissary far more than he needs it if he was at Fort Huachuca or Alaska or some place like that. He has a very tough time making it financially in this area. So naturally, as a spokesman for the uniformed side of the Army, I do not want to take those benefits away from them. On the other hand, you and the President and others expect me to manage that Army and to take care of its resources.

So I wear two hats. But I am very conscious of the sacrifices made by these young people and I realize that we like to talk about generals living high-on-the-hog and all that and the fancy golf course at McNair. But you know, if I set aside all of the generals and all of

the colonels and just said, "OK, you guys, go on over there and make do with what you have," what we are talking about when we talk about benefits is, almost 700,000—a good deal more than that—750,000 of that 785,000 are young people who are trying to make it. This, of course, is the problem in public relations we have.

Because when generals like myself screw it up or make a bad impression with respect to our lifestyles and all that, unfortunately it washes off on the whole Army and it really is not fair.

IQ LEVEL

Senator HOLLINGS. What about IQ proficiency level? Are you getting in the technicians capable of handling the new equipment?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir. You know, here is an example of when I am talking about the fragility of the volunteer program. In recent years we recruited on a month-by-month quota basis and the recruiters did not like that; they wanted to do it on a quarterly basis so they could just kind of ease along and see where they were at the end of the third month and then get in and scramble for people.

We have made it a 1-month thing and now we have gone to a weekly thing; so, the requirements of the unit, back through the training base and back to the type of man we need, is a very real-time linkage. We have tried that now for 3 months.

RIGHT MEN FOR RIGHT JOBS

The first month we could not make the numbers we needed, but we kept at it and I tell you, that recruiting force is really something else. They are producing the right men for the right jobs and they are doing it on a week-in-and-week-out basis. So we have now for the first time really got control of that system. So we do not have humps and valleys in our training base.

Now, about intellect, during the draft days we took maybe 20 percent, even somewhat higher than that, in what is called category IV. That is an intelligence level, just below average.

We are now taking about 6 percent. Those are good people and there are many jobs in the Army that they can do very well. What I am trying to do is give you a measure of the intelligence level of the people that we have in the Army now. They do make better soldiers and when they leave the Army, they make better citizens.

BUDGET PROJECTED TO UNEMPLOYMENT DECREASE

Senator HOLLINGS. On the matter of the budget as I see it, if it is projected that unemployment will go down by November of next year and the volunteer Army maintains its force levels, do you have an added cost? Let's say, unemployment does go back down to 7.2 percent.

We are at 8.6 percent unemployment now. If we go back down to 7.2 percent by November of next year, from a Budget Committee standpoint everything is going fine. But we do not want you to come back and say, "Wait a minute, we are having a hard time because the unemployment is down and they are not coming in like they used to," or is that the case? Are you projecting in your next year's budget a cost figure to take care of the decrease in unemployment?

PROGRAM CUTS

General WEYAND. No, sir, Mr. Chairman, we are not. But this does get to the point that concerns me about the cuts in recruiting strength, in our advertising budget, and in the incentives that we are able to provide to bring them into the Army for special skills. Every one of those programs is being cut, and I am confident that if we can maintain our recruiting base that as unemployment improves in this country, and certainly it is bound to, we will still be able to meet our needs.

Now there may be some drop in quality. We may not get the high rate of reenlistments that we now get, but I base that on the fact that with less effective recruiting of June of 2 years ago before this economic recession hit public consciousness, we were making our numbers. I think that we will continue. Then, of course, we got the climbing rate of unemployment and we did improve. But before all of this started, we were doing pretty well. I would not want to add any more money, but I would surely like, as I said, to keep for about a year the recruiting capability of this Army fairly intact.

Senator HOLLINGS. Senator Cranston.

SAVINGS IN CIVILIANIZING DUTIES

Senator CRANSTON. Since, traditionally, the military have received higher fringe benefits, now that pay rates have achieved comparability are there any significant savings in civilianizing various duties?

General WEYAND. Senator Cranston, I really do not believe so. We did that with KP. It translated into greatly increased morale of our men and a willingness to stay with us until they got into advanced training and into their units. But the money savings are probably very hard to come by. I cannot think of any of these fringe benefits that would help us out.

SAVINGS IN MANPOWER COSTS

Senator CRANSTON. Have any savings in manpower costs resulted from termination of our military activities in Southeast Asia?

General WEYAND. Yes, I would say there should have been sizable savings. The Army is now about half the size that it was during the Vietnam conflict. That alone should have brought us savings. Whether or not those savings were in a sense eaten up by inflation, I am not sure, but certainly a large part of those savings were eaten up by inflation.

Senator CRANSTON. It would be hard for inflation to eat up half the costs, would it not?

General WEYAND. I believe, in constant dollars, our budget in say 1968 was something over \$40 billion, and it is now down to \$24.6 billion, so in constant dollars that has been the savings; but I am sure your question stems from the fact you do not have the money in hand that has been saved.

Forty-seven point nine billion dollars was our budget in 1968 in constant dollars expressed in fiscal year 1976 terms, and it is interesting that in real dollars it was \$25 billion.

Our budget request for this year was \$24.6 billion, and yet the Army is half the size that it was then.

COSTS OF ADDING THREE DIVISIONS

Senator CRANSTON. Do you have figures that indicate the increased costs connected with adding these new divisions?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir, I do. It comes to a total over the 5-year period of \$1.893 billion. The first year costs were \$113 million because we procured very little, if any, equipment for those units. As we get into the out years, converting those units from headquarters type units, sedan drivers, support units, quartermaster units and the like, results in an increased equipment cost for rifles and tanks—well, rifles, they all have that, but for tanks and other gear, \$1.262 billion.

So that is where most of the costs are. There is no increase in military personnel costs. There is some increase in operation costs because a combat unit uses more money in training and so forth, and there is \$409 million in military construction, excluding family housing.

CURRENT TROOP STRENGTH ABROAD

Senator CRANSTON. What is the current level of U.S. troop strength abroad?

General WEYAND. Let's see. Of the Army personnel assigned to units we have about 40 to 45 percent of our troops overseas.

Senator CRANSTON. Over 45 percent?

General WEYAND. No, slightly less. The two main elements of that are 199,500 now in Europe and 34,000 some odd in Korea.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you expect it to be at the same level a year from now or higher or lower?

SOME REDUCTIONS IN THE PACIFIC

General WEYAND. There are some reductions that are in process in the Pacific. They are fairly small—a few thousand. These involve Thailand and some shifts in other smaller areas in the Pacific. The European strength I would expect to stay about the same. For our military assistance groups there are very small reductions. I would guess that it would be something in the magnitude of 3,000 to 5,000.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you recommend any cuts in overseas manpower strength anywhere in the world beyond those you have mentioned?

General WEYAND. I have not recommended any, Senator Cranston, in the absence of an agreement in the mutual balance of force reduction talks or any negotiations.

Pending that, I have not recommended any decreases in Europe and I have accepted the decreases in Thailand that we are talking about.

MBFR TALKS

Senator CRANSTON. Do you see any progress in the Military Balance Force Reduction (MBFR) talks?

General WEYAND. I am not close enough to say where they are in relation to a year ago; I think the negotiating team would have to answer that. I know that after Helsinki there was some comment on

both sides that indicated a hope for increased progress in MBFR, but I have not seen it yet.

Senator CRANSTON. If there is no progress in those negotiations are we then stuck with leaving troops in Europe at the current level indefinitely?

General WEYAND. Certainly as far as I can see, yes, sir.

Senator CRANSTON. Is it practical to believe that the Soviets have any real desire for success in those negotiations? It has often seemed to me that it might be disadvantageous from their point of view, because Soviet troop reduction might create slightly greater unrest, at least, and create a somewhat more difficult situation for them in countries in central Europe. They are able to maintain troops in those countries on the rationale that they need them because we have troops nearby. If we were not nearby in such strength, that would diminish the force of that argument and it might be a little more difficult from their point of view to keep things in order in these lands that are not really Russian territory?

WEAKNESS RATHER THAN STRENGTH

General WEYAND. I realize that, sir, and it is a very difficult thing to answer. You can, you know, go back to the philosophical issue of is it our strength and our presence that is destabilizing and that causes tension in various parts of the world. Historically, I think, we certainly have had it demonstrated that it has been our weakness rather than our strength that has gotten us involved or led to our involvement in past conflicts.

I just do not know what the Russians would do if we disarmed or decreased our strength over there unilaterally.

Certainly, the NATO force is not a force that a professional military man would judge to be either belligerent or offensively oriented. Now that is not to say it does not have a limited offensive capability, but as far as I can see, there should be no reason for the Soviets to be overly concerned about that force invading the Soviet Union. The difficulty I have with the Soviets has partly to do with the very high stature of the military in their society. With that, there is the emphasis or acceptance of the use of force to achieve their objectives. They have been increasing their conventional forces steadily, and I would not want to take the chance on upsetting what now seems to be a reasonable balance. Our foreign policy does seek to maintain that balance, and I believe that it would be very dangerous to unilaterally undo it unless we had something more positive to go on than we have now. We have reduced our troop strength in Europe over the years quite significantly and I could furnish that information for the record.

[The following was subsequently submitted for the record:]

TROOP STRENGTH REDUCED

The Army has reduced the authorized troop strength in Europe and Related Areas by more than 55,800 over a ten year period FY 66-FY 76 which represents a 21.8% decrease.

That is why I hesitated when I answered the question would the troop strength remain indefinitely, because it has not remained at a

constant high strength in the past, and whether or not that will change, I just do not know. I think we all have hopes for this element of our foreign policy which has to do with stabilizing our relationships with the Communist powers, and I am sure that it is that policy that has led to our negotiations with both the Soviet Union and our relations with the Peoples Republic of China. We do not know where that will lead except we certainly have got to have hopes for it.

HIGH LEVEL OF TROOPS NOT ADVANTAGEOUS

Senator CRANSTON. My point was they may be using our high level of troops as an excuse or pretext for their purposes in a way that may not be advantageous to us from our own long range point of view.

SOVIET CONCERN IN SATELLITE COUNTRIES

General WEYAND. They may be. I know that they are concerned and have been at times in the past about the situation in their satellite countries, and this has caused them to station forces in the Warsaw Pact countries. They have their concern about China, and just what part NATO plays in all that, I am not sure.

Senator HOLLINGS. We go to Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, and all the conferences that we have had to try to foster détente and make progress toward peace, I never have heard mentioned any high level of American troop presence by any of those governments or our legislative counterparts or anything else of that kind.

PRESENT LEVEL

Senator CRANSTON. Just use the words "present level."

Senator HOLLINGS. They do not even mention it. We could get into that. They cussed Kissinger for a good 3 days.

We tried to talk about Diego Garcia. They would not even talk about Diego Garcia. They cussed former Secretary Mel Laird for his article in the Reader's Digest on SALT, and we could go right on down the list. With respect to troops overseas. First, General Weyand, we have had comments that they are scattered all around the world in some couple of thousand different installations. When you say 45 percent of the Army was stationed around the world and while you do not recommend any cuts in Europe, you are going along with those in Thailand. What do you recommend with respect to all the other deployments?

Do you recommend any tapering down and removing of troops from any other assigned spot at this particular time? Are all of those absolutely necessary?

NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN TROOP NUMBERS

General WEYAND. No. There is some fine-tuning. I do not think there is anything that should merit your attention, but there are areas where we can effect savings. Part of it has to do with the drawdown from Vietnam and certainly our changed posture in the Pacific, but these are very small numbers. Wherever we have any significant numbers of troops, I do not see any change.

In Panama, for example, we have cut that down now to a brigade. It would not seem to me to be prudent to cut it any further because we do envisage providing at some point in time a defensive force in which the Panama National Guard will be a part. That brigade is about as small a unit as you could put in a strategic place like that and expect them to accomplish the type of mission they might have to do.

These other places we are talking about are military assistance advisory groups and attaché offices and things like that, and I think we just have to take each one of those and scrub it down. This has been one of the good things about striving for 16 divisions, because to get 16 divisions out of 785,000 men is improving on our performance by nearly 200,000 men. We had 16 divisions in 1964, with a total military strength of 973,000 men and 51,000 more civilians, including National Guard technicians, than we have today.

STAYING CAPABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY

So we are stretched very thin and the Army is looking very hard for spaces and people that are doing jobs that do not have to be done. For example, as I sit here I am concerned about the support capability of the Army. We have been cutting back on it. But one of the characteristics of the Army that has permitted it to perform its military functions effectively over the years is its staying capability, its sustainability. In Korea, the Army defeated the Chinese and the North Koreans not with any fancy footwork. The Inchon landing was a great strategic stroke and got that battle back on a favorable footing for us.

You will recall from then on that whole war was simply one of the battle line moving slowly but inexorably forward day and night. There was very little maneuver in a strategic sense involved in it. Why were we able to do that? It was because we were able to fight 24 hours a day and maintain the pressure. They simply could not maintain the sort of resistance or offensive pressure that we could.

REDUCTION IN CIVILIAN WORKING FORCE

So as a general, I am concerned that I do not do violence to that very important characteristic of the Army. When I mentioned civilians, we have a good deal smaller number of civilians than we have had in the past. When you asked me that question about could we civilianize, I lost my train of thought and did not answer it fully. I find that our civilians, as I said, are more expensive than our soldiers. One of the troublesome things to me has to do with reductions in our civilian working force.

I think this coming year the reduction is some 7,500—that means that I have to take soldiers to do many of those jobs. That detracts from readiness and that is undesirable.

Now some of it we do and we do it gladly because interestingly enough, doing these jobs at installations provides a diversion and a change for soldiers who get pretty bored with doing the same thing in some units day in and day out. But by and large these civilian force reductions are cutting into our combat capability and our readiness.

Senator HOLLINGS. Not with respect to the Pentagon. It has been reported by my colleague, Senator Goldwater, that the civil servants

over there run it. Secretary Schlesinger is reported to say if he could get the 25-percent cut in the civilian personnel over there he could promote efficiency.

Do you find any basis for a statement of that kind or do you have any comments you would like to make?

PROPER BALANCE NEEDED

General WEYAND. Well, yes—I do not know about the figure of 25 percent. My experience has been that the smaller headquarters get the jobs done more quickly and provide more satisfying experiences for the people who are working there.

Again, it is like everything else, there has to be a proper balance to it. General Abrams and I had a very unique experience for generals in that we closed out Vietnam. We took a very, very large headquarters, one piece of it, and we knew it was going to have to go to zero at a given point in time. As we cut that headquarters and still tried to maintain all of the controls and exercise the leadership of our forces that was demanded, we found it to be a very interesting experience. We first cut horizontally, 10 percent, then 20 percent, and the headquarters performed very well. Then we found assignments falling between the chairs in an unprofessional manner; in the headquarters itself, the people were uptight because they were trying to do too much.

Then we began cutting vertically, doing away with functions and cutting people at the same time. That then got us back on an even keel. That is the way we went until the headquarters zeroed out. This is what we have been trying to do at the Pentagon, for example, on the Army's side.

GRADE STRUCTURE AND JOBS

We have cut that staff, it is about half what it was in the Vietnam war. We have decreased the grade structure for generals, and we are going to have to keep on doing that but not at the rate we did. I am trying to keep pressure on to continue to reduce that headquarters by about 5 percent a year. I do not know whether we can do it now, but that is what I am requiring, and I have to do that because this Army has got to get back to the point where colonels are important; and the colonel to be important has to recognize that his job is important, that he is not just doing something that several other people review and change and all that.

He has to have a sense of responsibility, a feeling of responsibility and accomplishment. To do that he cannot look next door and see some colonel who is range officer or something like that. So this is a slow process, but we are determined to pursue it and it is quite complex. It is not just numbers. It is grade structure and it is jobs. We have moved a lot of jobs out of Washington down to our two major subordinate commands and that has produced very healthy results.

MORE INNOVATIVE

I think the Army is becoming more innovative. We recognize that in the future we may have to fight an enemy that out numbers us.

I believe that with improved tactics, increased antitank and antiair capability, taking full advantage of missile technology, all-weather operations, and the mental determination or conviction, we can do the job. We will do it.

Senator HOLLINGS. I know with the drawdown in Vietnam it is more or less a foreign policy rather than a defense question right now, in a sense predominated by foreign policy considerations. We were told 6 years ago by the Korean officials that they could go it alone without American troops if they were given modernized equipment.

What is the Army doing about that now? They have just said, "We do not need the 40,000 troops you have over here in Korea, if you just give us the up-to-date equipment our troops could defend against North Korea without any trouble at all."

SOUTH KOREANS CAPABLE

General WEXAND. I like to think that is correct. We have not given them the support to carry out that modernization program they talked about. As you recall at that time it was to be a 5-year modernization program and it was not carried out. We are trying to get back to that.

They have been moving slowly toward that. I, too, believe that the South Koreans are very capable. Our force over there is a force that serves as a deterrent to aggression or adventurism on the part of the North. It is generally a situation even more sensitive than NATO in that Japan is virtually defenseless and Japan is the keystone of stability and, as a matter of fact, of the free world in that very important part of the world.

AMERICAN TROOPS ARE KEY

Korea is an essential element in the defense of Japan. Now what will it take to cause Kim Il Sung to deter or defer any ideas he has about attacking the South? I am convinced that those American troops are the key to that.

I talked with Omar Bradley not too long ago and he was reminiscing about the days of Korea in 1950 and I was there at that time. I never want to see that repeated when a commander like MacArthur put the 24th Division into Korea. He testified later before Congress that he did it knowing that division would probably be destroyed because it was not ready for combat, was poorly equipped, and poorly trained. But by his audacity, he hoped to convince the enemy that he had a greater force at his disposal than he had, and to give him time so he could get in additional forces. It worked. But it is a hell of a commentary on a Nation as strong and as powerful as we are to be reduced to those sort of circumstances. That division over there now is a fairly small price to pay for preventing what we have seen in the past.

SOLDIER'S VIEW

I must say, though, that Omar Bradley told me he was out there the week before that war broke out and all of our people assured him that there was no possibility of a conflict. He says to this day he is convinced that if we had not pulled out our last forces from Korea that war would never have happened.

IMPORTANT TO PREVENT ATTACK

That is a soldier's view of it. Now we look to the future. I just do not know what will maintain the stability in that area. I think certainly we do not want to gamble on the South being able to defend themselves. The city of Seoul is only 40 kilometers from the front lines. It is within range of the North Koreans shortly after they initiate the attack. I believe that it is important to us to keep that attack from ever occurring if we can possibly do it, if it is affordable for us. There may come a time when it is not. I do not know.

SINAI ACCORD

Senator HOLLINGS. Are there any additional requirements placed on the Army by the Sinai accord?

General WEYAND. Sir, although we have not gotten any requirement and certainly none for people, and none for major items of equipment, I believe that there may be some requirement for us to furnish tents, support, and supply certain types of things that we have in our inventories; but I have not received such a request yet.

5-YEAR PLAN IN KOREA

Senator CRANSTON. Before we get too far away from Korea, I just want to follow up on one thing you said. I gather that while you do feel under present circumstances the American troops on the ground there are essential as a deterrent that you also feel this 5-year plan if carried through, of modernization of the South Korean Armed Forces might well make it possible to take them out of there?

General WEYAND. I think we would have to consider that. We made a bargain with them, and if we keep our end of it then I think we certainly will look at force levels over there.

COST OF PLAN

Senator HOLLINGS. Do you have or could you furnish later for the record the cost of that 5-year plan and then how much would be saved after it had been implemented?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you have any overall figures on that available now?

General WEYAND. I am sorry, I do not, sir. But I will get it for the record.

[The following was subsequently submitted for the record:]

The ROK Forces Five Year Modernization Plan was approved by President Nixon in 1970. It provided for \$1.5 billion (TOA) over the period FY 71-75. Of this amount, no more than \$1.25 billion was to be new obligational authority with the remaining \$25 billion made up from non-reimbursable transfers (i.e., excess defense articles and equipment transferred under the authority of PL 91-652.)

In 1974 the ROKG was advised that the Modernization Plan could not be completed by FY 75 and must be extended. The time required to complete the program is dependent upon the level of Security Assistance funding appropriated by the Congress.

The status of actual modernization funding/transfers as compared to the original plan is shown in the tables below :

[In millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year—					Total
	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	
New obligational authority:						
Plan.....	295.0	280.0	250.0	215.0	210.0	1,250.0
Funded.....	293.2	155.8	149.1	150.7	¹ 141.6	890.4
Cumulative shortfall.....	-1.8	-126.0	-226.9	-291.2	-359.6	-359.6
Nonreimbursable equipment transfers:						
Plan.....	158.9	24.9	19.7	11.5	15.5	² 250.0
Actual.....	³ 45.9	³ 75.9	³ 9.9	³ 5.9	⁴ 3.1	140.7
Cumulative shortfall.....	-113.0	-62.0	-71.8	-77.4	-89.8	-89.8

¹ Includes \$82,600,000 for F-5E procurement, P.C.H. & T. costs and training; and \$59,000,000 FMSCR.

² Includes \$19,500,000 unidentified in any one year.

³ Valued at $\frac{1}{3}$ acquisition value.

⁴ Acquisition value.

The President has requested the following funds be approved by the Congress for FY76 and FY77:

[In millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year—	
	1976	1977
MAP.....	74.0	1.4
FMS credit.....	126.0	1.5
Training.....	2.5	.2
Total.....	202.5	3.1

The funds necessary for completion of the program will be requested in FY77.

The Army feels strongly that its forces in Korea serve as a vital deterrent and a stabilizing influence in Northeast Asia. However, should all forces be withdrawn, the incremental annual cost savings would approximate:

[In millions of dollars]

	1st year ¹	Succeeding years
MPA.....	\$27.3	\$89.2
OMA.....	30.8	139.1
Total.....	58.1	228.3

¹ Assumes deployment of all troops on a straight-line basis with 20 percent replacement during 1st 6 mo., return of all DA civilians and reduction in force of Korean Nationals.

Additional, sizeable one-time stationing costs would be incurred in CONUS and its magnitude would depend upon the location, condition of existing facilities, and added construction requirements.

TYPE OF WAR ANTICIPATED IN EUROPE

Senator HOLLINGS. I would like to jump back to Europe and the statement about fighting an army that outnumbers you. We are talking about mutual balance of force reduction. Of course, I am sure all

of us do not see it really as a balance, as the superiority by the Soviets continues to increase.

I am talking about the number of troops. I think it is 4 to 1 in tanks, 2.5 to 1 in troops, almost 3 to 1 in airpower. I am talking from memory now of a year or so ago at another NATO meeting before General Davison left Heidelberg.

What kind of war in Europe does your force plan and anticipate? How long would it be conventional, and when would it go nuclear? Can you give the committee some idea about the requirements there?

USE OF ARMOR AND MECHANIZED FORCES

General WEYAND. Sir, I would expect that war, if it were launched by the Soviet Union, would be characterized by very massive use of armor and mechanized forces. If they stick with their doctrine, it will be multipoint attack, that is they will attempt to punch through our lines at a number of places, and then they will feed divisions in column through those holes in an effort to cut into the rear and exploit their success.

MAIN AND SECONDARY EFFORTS

They will probably have one main effort that I would guess would drive toward the Channel, and they would have a secondary effort which could be quite sizable. Where that would come we just do not know.

MET WITH COUNTER-WEAPONRY

Either one of those efforts might go through the Fulda Gap or through the north plains. Therefore, in the opening days of that war, it is going to be very intense and we are going to have to meet it with antitank forces and with an ability to shift forces quite quickly once we determine where that main effort is.

We have wargamed all sorts of combinations of that scenario and we have been structuring our force over there to meet that type of attack. This is one of the reasons for changing the ratio of our combat to support, to get as much as possible of our combat strength up toward where we can meet such a massive type of assault and slow it down and then turn it back.

We do not want to give away a lot of terrain. We do not want to let them get in deep. We could let them get deep with one or two thrusts if we could hold the rest of it and then go to work on those. We expect, as I say, the Soviet attack to be heavy in armor, supported by a fairly sizable number of fighter interceptors, and we will have to meet it with counter-weaponry.

ANTITANK CAPABILITY INCREASED

We have greatly increased our antitank capability in Europe in the last 1½ or 2 years.

Our strategy or tactics up forward have changed. We are much less inclined to go for a highly fluid mobile defense than we are for a defense which incorporates strong points and mobility.

CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT

Senator HOLLINGS. And it would remain conventional, according to your force plan for a matter of at least 5 or 6 weeks?

General WEYAND. Sir, I would hope that we could keep it conventional through the entire conflict. I think it is terribly important that we meet that attack early, rather than to let it gain momentum for just that reason, to keep that nuclear threshold high and to make it clear to the Soviets in the event of such an attack that the casualties, the costs, and the possibilities of escalation are going to outweigh the objectives that they then feel they can attain.

TEMPTATION EXAMPLE

Let me give you an example of the sort of temptation that likely comes to a potential adversary of ours if our conventional force is weak, and that is the temptation to take a small grab, relatively small. Hitler did it. Other armies have done it in the past, to simply take a bite and then wait and see what happens.

I think this is the type of thing that we, as we think about scenarios and the military side, have to consider and deal with, particularly in an environment of nuclear parity or nuclear stalemate. Once when we had overwhelming nuclear superiority that left us options with respect to using that a lever or a Sword of Damocles to attain our will, but that capability or option has been very greatly diminished now.

72-HOUR SCENARIO

Senator HOLLINGS. It has been argued, General, with respect to reducing the troops in Europe that we would be forced, due to the overwhelming number and strength of the Soviets, into a real attack within 72 hours. Why couldn't a tripwire that was smaller suit our purpose?

HIGH NUCLEAR THRESHOLD

General WEYAND. I think 100,000 troops would simply lower the nuclear threshold to the point where at some time in history you could be assured that there would be aggression in Europe to test that, the enemy, knowing full-well that he could drive through that force, take any objective he desired, and then face us with an "All right, do you want to incinerate both of us or are you going to be willing to bargain?"

I think in laymen's terms that is what we could be looking at. We have got to keep that nuclear threshold—or the likelihood of using nuclear weapons—very, very high.

Senator CRANSTON. You did not consider the 72-hour scenario that Senator Hollings referred to and that others have suggested as being realistic under present circumstances?

General WEYAND. No, sir, I do not. I do believe that our nuclear force over there is, as the professionals say, a continuum of our conventional force. It is there to act as a deterrent to the other side. It is conceivable that force would be used under certain circumstances, but they are circumstances that I hope no one will force upon us.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator CRANSTON. You believe that the present situation there would mean no immediate use, or no need for a fast decision on the use of nuclear weapons?

MOVE TOWARD POSTPONING USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

General WEYAND. All of my energies in terms of deployments and re-adjustments of our force structure in Europe are pointed toward insuring that is the case, and I have been heartened as we have run our wargames and they reflect our improved antitank capabilities, the strengthening of our forward combat forces over there, the improved tactics, and the improved professionalism of the force that we have there, we see all of those elements reflected in the outcome of these wargames and analyses that we do. We are moving very strongly toward that sort of a position where we are postponing any likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons.

ADVANCE WARNING

Senator CRANSTON. If developments were adverse in conventional warfare, how far ahead would you be able to perceive that it might become necessary to consider the use of tactical weapons? How much advance warning would you have before the point would be reached where you might have to finally make that decision?

General WEYAND. Sir, I really do not know. I think it would be unprofessional for me to even hazard a guess because I simply do not know.

When people say we could be overrun in 2 weeks or those sorts of terms I do not even know what they are talking about in a professional and military sense.

USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN 72 HOURS

Senator HOLLINGS. I think, General, on that score, it should be noted that as Senators we receive briefings. I listened as closely as I could at a briefing in Heidelberg—CENTAG or whatever it is, we are not as familiar with all of these alphabets as the armed services fellows are—but I know they said in 72 hours they would have to use the tactical.

I do not know what the generals are telling you—how stretched out they are and how they need help—but on such an important matter there ought to be some kind of constant policy and dictum from the Chief of Staff on down.

CHANGES FOR THE BETTER

General WEYAND. There should be, sir, and I think there has been. There have been differences of opinion of the type I just mentioned a moment ago. But I will be interested, if you get a chance to go over this year or the early part of next year, to see what your conclusions are. I think what I am saying reflects the opinion of General Blanchard, the commander over there. He has had a lot of experience in Europe. There have been some very important changes in that situation for the better.

FORCE PLANNING PROCESS

Senator HOLLINGS. Let's talk for a second about the policy which. I am sure, Senator Cranston and I would both be interested in with respect to the force planning process. Who determines the scenarios on which these forces are planned? I can understand the Secretary of the Army leaving office and saying they did not brief me on operations, but I do not feel badly because the Secretary of the Air Force only knew they were bombing Hanoi when he turned on the CBS morning news. As Chief of Staff, what input do you have on the make up of these scenarios? That is what we are trying to get—some basis of how we will spend money over the next several years.

CONTINUING INPUT

General WEYAND. It is continuing processes and my input is pretty much continuing. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I, along with my staff, have influence on the joint strategic objectives plan which takes the National Security Council guidance. This in turn, stems from agreement on our foreign policy objectives which are quite broad. The joint strategic objectives plan then translates guidance into what we would like to do and what we believe is necessary to do, to meet our policy commitments.

FOCUSED ON OUR OBJECTIVES

Now, that is not completely unconstrained by costs and actual capabilities. Naturally, the plan to be something other than utterly ridiculous does take into account the real world. But basically, it is focused on our objectives. That then is followed by a joint strategic capability plan which takes what we have in hand and therefore in strength of numbers of divisions and ships and squadrons of aircraft and so forth, and applies those forces to a plan that is made up of regional packages.

TWO-PERCENT COST GROWTH

Now, the guidance for what we will have in a military sense in Europe, in East Asia and the Pacific, in the Middle East and in Africa, and in Latin America and so forth, comes from the Secretary of Defense, again working in concert with the National Security Council. So gradually we go from a worldwide look to the regional look. When I said the Army today is the result of an evolutionary process, we were looking forward to the future of about a 2-percent cost growth in the Army across the board.

In some areas such as procurement of equipment, we were hoping for about a 4-percent increase because my inventory of weapons is shy of the objective by some \$11 billion worth of equipment, not counting ammunition shortages. I would like to see us move toward cutting that shortfall. In many items of equipment, I am short enough that I cannot give the Reserve components the equipment that they need and in some very few cases even to train on.

Going back to that 2-percent cost growth per year, that gives us a measure of the budget that we hoped to get for next year, and fiscal years 1978 and 1979 and on out for a 5-year projection.

PROVIDE 16 DIVISIONS

Within that, I can provide, I hope, 16 divisions. That is more than we have ever provided before for that size budget and that number of people. As we move along on that, there is a continuing dialog between myself and the Secretary of Defense, through our staffs, on a whole number of issues. Last year there were 150-some-odd issues which I had to address as Chief of Staff as we worked our way through the final budget. These included such items as: My forces and my end strength, the size of the recruiting budget, the number of paid drill strength for the Reserve Forces, the percentage of officers in the Army versus enlisted men, and the size of the training base. Each one of them was anywhere from \$50,000 to, for example, Safeguard which was \$40 million.

Each one of those is treated in isolation. Then I get an opportunity in December to go before the Secretary of Defense and argue my position, or for my position, on any of those that I feel strongly about. So there is just a whole lot of dialog going on back and forth, but within this framework of \$20 billion-some-odd and 16 divisions.

BUDGET CUTS CAUSE EXAMINATION OF PRIORITIES

Now, historically averaging over the last 3 years, the Defense Department has cut from my budget about \$1 billion a year. The Congress has cut between \$1 billion and \$2 billion. So when that happens, I have to go back and review the bidding. That is the way the process goes. We have formal names that we attach to these things like defense programing and planning guidance, and planning and budgeting guidelines, and so forth. But it is a year-round affair that reaches its peak just about now. Now, there is great discussion about the possibility of very severe budget restrictions in 1977. As I become sure of what those might be, or will be, then I will have to go back and examine the priorities of the Army.

Do we want to maintain high readiness or do we want to take what we have and spread it across the board and maintain force structure, but at a lower state of readiness? Do we keep 16 divisions? The Senator asked me about the costs of those divisions. There are costs related to them so these tradeoffs will be proposed by the Office of Management and Budget, by the Secretary of Defense, and by me. If we ever start out in agreement, it will be the first time in the years that I have been here. It gets to be a pretty interesting match.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator HOLLINGS. The policy by the National Security Council to the Joint Chiefs, is that in writing?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir. The Joint Chiefs no longer attend the National Security Council meetings. I do not mean that is anything

recent; it has been quite a while ago. The chairman does attend all of them.

Not only does he bring us the first report, but the significant policies are always made a matter of record.

BUDGET FOR NEXT 5 YEARS

Senator HOLLINGS. What about the Army's budget for the next 5 years? Can you give that to the committee? What would you do with a 10-percent increase, and what would you do with a 10-percent cut?

General WEYAND. I am not prepared to do that today, sir.

Senator HOLLINGS. You could furnish that for the record?

General WEYAND. You had better let me think about that one. I have had very bitter experience with telling people what I would do with a 10-percent cut. But seriously, yes, I will try to find the words to do that.

[The following was subsequently submitted for the record:]

Estimation of the Army's budget requirements for the next five years in specific amounts is difficult at best, because of the unknown factors in the situation. However, as discussed earlier in my opening statement, our current five year program includes a total Army force of 24 divisions and a relatively stable personnel strength for the Active Army and Reserve Components. This suggests budgets in the future approximating our current level, but adjusted upward to allow for pay and price increases, and some modest real growth in our investment accounts.

A ten percent increase to the Army's budget, to the extent it is an increase over and above inflation, would clearly improve overall Army readiness. In the short run, we would probably apply a portion of the increase to a reduction in the backlog in depot maintenance and the maintenance of real property. If military strength remains stable, a large portion of the increase would flow into reducing our \$11 billion shortfall in equipment necessary to equip and modernize our forces and provide war reserve stocks to sustain them in combat. A ten-percent increase would give us the opportunity to prepare for the future by pursuit of a more aggressive research and development program in badly needed areas such as signal intelligence, electronic warfare, and to enhance our technological base. In addition, in the process of increasing the number of Army combat units, we have reduced our support forces, hence, the capability of the Army to sustain its forces in combat. This conscious decision was made to increase early available combat power, recognizing the risks inherent in a weakened capability to support the force. Additional resources would be applied toward returning a balance between support and combat forces and a reduction of this risk.

Conversely, budget reductions can only degrade Army readiness and slow or halt the objectives of modernizing the reserves and Active Army and improving the warfighting capability of the total force. A large budget reduction of ten percent would require major cuts in the investment accounts (RDT&E, Procurement), require reassessment of major programs, would result in stretchout, resultant higher costs and cancellation of some. A cut of this magnitude would, in fact, threaten the size of the Army itself.

Senator HOLLINGS. We have to look at it. We are trying our very best to learn. The gentleman from California is not extreme and I am not extreme but he thinks, I am sure, that it could be cut a little more than what I think it could be cut. We are both trying to get guidance from you.

General WEYAND. I realize it is not an adversary relationship and all that, but you see I have watched the line——

INTELLIGENCE

Senator HOLLINGS. Let's take a specific, intelligence. We spend billions and then we find out a lot of that comes under you. Can you economize on that and what about the overlapping?

Can you save any under your intelligence budget in the Army? Everything seems to be a surprise. You say General Bradley said everything was fine and then all of a sudden there was an attack. Are we getting the true dollar value in intelligence in the Army and with all the defense intelligence agencies. Have you thought about that in any economies that can be effected there?

General WEYAND. I have thought about it, sir, for the Army. As for that bigger picture I think there are enough good minds working on that that I will leave it to you. I do not think I could add much to that debate.

HIDDEN FIGURES

Senator HOLLINGS. We are trying to find some \$600 million and where it came from. We spent nights up here looking and then found it under your budget on intelligence.

Does it hurt for you as a commander to have those figures surface? Do you like to have them hidden in your budgets? We have gotten to the position where you have taken a lot of gaff on this.

General WEYAND. I think that figure is hidden in somebody else's budget. I hope so.

FUND TRANSFERS

Senator HOLLINGS. Another example occurred when the administration was attempting to find money for Cambodia. We in the Congress tried to refuse but we were told, in essence, by Secretary Richardson that they were going to spend it anyway. You, of course, were in Saigon at the time. Now 2 years after Secretary Richardson's appearance, at 8 p.m. last Wednesday night, I finally found the money, \$331.9 billion or something in that neighborhood and it was taken from your ammunition account.

You were just talking about the shortfall. Is that what they do, just call up General Weyand and say, "Oh, those billions you have for ammunition, just forget about buying any for a year or so, we are going to take that money and put it into Cambodia"? How does that thing work? As Senators, we are frustrated.

We cannot get the truth from the Secretary. If there is one thing I could do, it would be to find some guidance on that.

General WEYAND. Sir, I think the frustrations of the Congress are very evident and certainly obviously justified. You recall during that period that you all forced the accounting for those funds to move toward the MAP-type of programing and accountability. Had that been done from the beginning I am sure it would have put great constraints on the running of the war, which were the arguments, as I recall, used against going that way. But it also would, of course, provide the safeguards that you are looking for.

NO LONGER IN EFFECT

Now the situation is that I do not have them coming to me with those sort of fund transfers. But I am still paying the price for that sort of procedure. As a matter of fact, the most serious of the violations of the Antidefficiency Act that I am dealing with now go back to those years where money was transferred, hundreds of millions of dollars, from one appropriations account to another. Although, for example, in the Army's case we got full return for the money, the fact of the matter was we did not have the money to spend because it had been transferred out. Now those procedures are no longer in effect.

INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY AT COMBAT LEVEL

Getting back to the intelligence picture, down at the combat level we do need some priority attention given to intelligence. It is not a tremendously costly thing at that level but it is necessary for the effectiveness of intelligence, I think, by and large, our intelligence has been pretty good.

As you say, we seem to be continuously surprised, and as a matter of fact, one of the objectives of the Army is to be prepared for the unexpected. That is why we have flexibility built into it.

I do not think with the sort of systems that we are working against or that are working against us in the world that we are ever going to have a good idea of what is going on. The thing that bothers me equally as much is the decisionmaking process. For example, in Vietnam in March of 1972, we knew the attack was coming; we could see the tanks getting ready, and the vehicles, and the truck parks, and so on and so forth. There were many times in the Vietnam war when what the enemy was up to was very clear but the reactions were something less than adequate. So I think there is enough, not blame, but shortcomings, to be passed around to everybody without focusing on the intelligence community.

FIGURES HIDDEN OR PADDED

Senator CRANSTON. Could I ask one thing on that? Just pursuing what Senator Hollings was asking you in regard to the money for the intelligence community, the costs not only of the CIA but of other units in the intelligence community add up to several billion dollars. But, when you look through the Federal budget you do not find those figures any place. They just are not there, which means, obviously, that they are hidden someplace, that some figures are padded. That leads to doubt about the reliability of any single figure in the military budget and possibly in Agriculture and Treasury and a couple of other places, though it is my understanding that most of it is in one place or another in the military budget.

Do you know exactly where all of those figures are?

STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

General WEXAND. I know where they are in the Army, Senator Cranston, but I do not know where they are outside, and even in the Army

you can do most anything with figures. For example, if I took the enlisted men who are down there in the reconnaissance patrols or platoons and any armored cavalry regiments, which basically have the reconnaissance on the borders, and functions of target acquisition and the like, these are regular combat units and they are performing what purists would say was an intelligence function. And I have had people come and say you are spending \$2 or \$3 billion on intelligence.

Now, I will wager, or I would guess that the sort of figures you get are being prepared on the sort of basis that I am talking about. Anybody who is involved in any way in acquiring some knowledge about the other side or what might happen is categorized as intelligence. If that is the way those figures are reached, then they are not only meaningless, but they are counter—well, they are not helpful. Because it does not give you an opportunity to see what kind of intelligence we are talking about. Are you talking about strategic intelligence or tactical intelligence?

If it is strategic intelligence, then you can relate that to Cyprus or Turkey and Greece or whatever it is that concerns you.

But just walking in with these huge lump sums and dumping them on your desk, I think are a disservice to you. That is about all I can contribute to that, which is not much, I admit.

INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY

Senator CRANSTON. Apparently there are at least nine separate Federal agencies or subagencies that have intelligence responsibility, such as the CIA and the National Reconnaissance Agency, and they have specific personnel costs and equipment costs and operational costs, and those have to be spread around in the budget, too, quite apart from the direct costs you are referring to, which, arguably, can be interpreted as intelligence or otherwise.

But if any of those are padded into the Army budget, you presumably know where they are; and although that figure says so much for some particular Army function, you do not particularly have that much for that particular Army function, isn't that correct?

General WEYAND. That is true. I do not know how you can equate intelligence, its productivity, to the money. I know you have to do that. I admit that. But I am about halfway through the book called "The Bodyguard Full of Lies," and it was about the same as the one by the British about getting into and reading the German traffic in World War II.

I had not realized until reading this book, based on documents released by the British Government, the full extent of that intelligence activity, not only seeking intelligence from the other side but then the deception operations which follows behind it of feeding false and misleading information into what the enemy thought was a secure system or systems. You can make a pretty good case for that war being lost on the basis of that intelligence operation.

Now, there is no way you could cut that out. That is the thing that naturally worries us all about intelligence; how do you get at overlapping, redundant activities and needless stuff and still not throw out the

sort of programs that may mean the difference between survival and destruction for this country? I do not know. I do not think that in this hearing I am in today we ought to pursue it much further.

Senator HOLLINGS. We will try to close here at 12 o'clock, if there is no objection.

Senator CRANSTON. I did have a topic which would require more time.

DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Senator HOLLINGS. With regard to the decisionmaking process within DOD, I'd like to ask this: many of my friends in the Army and the Pentagon uniformly agree that there is an overlapping and that there could be not only a promotion of efficiency but also economy if we could cut out this overlapping. The reorganization of the Pentagon under President Truman originally envisioned the Secretary of Defense at the top and then an assistant secretary for each service immediately under him rather than our current system whereby decisions progress all the way through the Secretary of the Army's Office and then come all the way back up the ladder to the Secretary of Defense. Do you have any comment about that?

COMPLICATED SYSTEM

General WEYAND. I do not think, sir, that it would be helpful for me to really comment on that. There are an awful lot of people that get into the act. It is a complicated system because it is running a department, even like the Army. It is not a nice, clean-cut instrument. It is very fragmented.

So you do need a lot of people keeping track of things and all of that. But, let me say, it is not unmanageable. It is not the easiest thing to work your way through. But I do not have any—

Senator HOLLINGS. Could you recognize the decision after it is worked through?

IMPORTANT ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN TO THE TOP

General WEYAND. Yes; I can. Seriously, with the Secretary of Defense I never had a problem getting to him; I never had a problem with him giving me sufficient time to lay it out. Secretary Schlesinger met with the Joint Chiefs once a week. He was willing to stay in that meeting as long as we were willing to stay, and by that I mean on into the night, talk about anything you wanted to, not necessarily related to just strategy and all that—but service problems. So, although the staff becomes a real problem now and then, the fact is that the important actions that you know about, you can take to the top.

That has been a very helpful thing.

COSTS OF REDUCING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator CRANSTON. I have just one area I want to get into a little bit. What would be the costs, both dollarwise and posturwise, of reducing the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Korea on the one hand, and Europe on the other?

General WEYAND. Sir, let me get that for the record for you, too. Do you want to set some sort of level on it of a 20-percent reduction, or are you thinking of something more massive than that?

Senator CRANSTON. Alternatively, let us take two hypothetical cuts, of 20 and 40 percent, respectively.

General WEYAND. Let me give you that for the record.

Senator CRANSTON. I would appreciate it if you could include all of the costs of obtaining the weapons, protecting them, and paying for the personnel connected with them.

SAVINGS COME FROM THE SECURITY

General WEYAND. It is usually, as you know, in terms of security personnel and the installation itself, but the savings come from the security. If you are talking about the near term, there is a cost avoidance to work on providing security.

Senator CRANSTON. What about the advisability or inadvisability of doing that, apart from the costs involved?

General WEYAND. That stockpile and those systems are under continuous review, and as systems become obsolete or systems become more capable and can displace others, that is being done.

Now again, I would have to supply you with something for the record, because it is a subject that admittedly is sensitive for open session. [The following was subsequently submitted for the record:]

The levels of tactical nuclear weapons deployed overseas are critically reviewed each year. The Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan and provide it to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the State Department, furnishes a DOD recommended nuclear weapons deployment authorization to the President, who issues an annual authorization document establishing the approved levels.

The size, composition and deployment of theater nuclear weapons are matters of political as well as military importance. Our forward deployed weapons are concrete evidence of the U.S. nuclear commitment to the defense of our allies. Particularly in NATO, [deleted] full consultations with the Allies in both the military and political deliberations that could lead to any changes in posture are required. [Deleted.] Proposed adjustment would not be undertaken without reference to their possible repercussions [deleted].

Specifically, with regard to the percentage reductions which have been mentioned, reductions of about 20%, or even 40%, of the theater nuclear weapons currently in [deleted] might be achieved with an acceptable military risk in the future. This would be contingent on the transfer of [deleted] and other adjustments being effected to reflect revised operational commitments. However, the timing of such reductions could be politically sensitive in light of concerns over the continued firmness of the U.S. commitment to the defense of our allies. Therefore, the political importance of maintaining current levels of deployed nuclear weapons in any foreign nation might be an overriding factor at least in the near term.

Turning to [deleted] a 20% reduction in theater nuclear weapons [deleted]. The [deleted] withdrawals [deleted] will be facilitated through the deployment of modernized theater nuclear weapons such as LANCE, the W61 bomb and the new 8" nuclear projectile, the deployment of enhanced conventional weapons, and changes in employment policy involving shifting of target responsibilities.

Currently there are approximately 7,000 U.S. theater nuclear warheads deployed ashore in Europe. More than [deleted] of these weapons are deployed to directly support nuclear-capable Allied forces under approved programs of cooperation. It is considered that significant reductions in these program of cooperation weapons are [deleted] in the context of today's environment. Thus, a

reduction of 20%, or about 1,400 weapons, would represent [deleted] of the nuclear weapons currently supporting U.S. forces in Europe.

Similarly, a 40% reduction would represent more than [deleted] of the weapons currently supporting U.S. forces. Such a [deleted] reduction of our theater nuclear weapons would [deleted] weaken the U.S. theater nuclear component of the NATO trial. It could introduce an unacceptable level of military risk into our posture by making a preemptive theater nuclear strike a more attractive option from a Soviet point of view, thereby lowering the nuclear threshold. Finally, it should be pointed out that the impact of any percentage reduction on our posture would be critically dependent on the type of weapons and locations from which they are to be withdrawn.

Turning to dollar costs, a reduction in the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe can have a wide degree of cost implications for the Army. A reduction of either 20% or 40% of the Army weapons at each site, for example, would not produce any significant savings. All sites would remain open and would require maintenance and security upkeep funding. All of the security and almost all of the maintenance personnel would continue to be required for the remaining weapons.

Hypothetical selective reductions of 20% and 40% have not been examined by the Army. However, recent studies have looked at the impact of [deleted] reductions in the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. These reductions postulated some site closures and, therefore, savings in money and personnel. Estimates for the [deleted] reductions, as far as Army impact, are :

Number of sites closed	MILCON dollars saved (millions)	O. & M.A. dollars saved (thousand per year)	Personnel saved
[Deleted]-----	10.0	-----	0
	2.7	160	398
	12.7	160	398
	16.0	-----	0
	12.6	-----	0
	4.8	300	550
	33.4	300	550

Closure of [deleted] sites would not save personnel because the security of those sites is performed as an additional duty by the firing units. The great bulk of the money saved is actually cost avoidance of MILCON security upgrade money.

It is important to note that the number of personnel and amount of money saved is highly dependent on the hypothesized mix of weapons removed and the resultant number of sites closed. Virtually every mix will produce a different set of savings.

The dollar cost with regard to [deleted] is a much simpler matter since a reduction of 20% or 40% in the numbers of Army tactical nuclear weapons there will not save any money or personnel. The Army storage site [deleted] would still be required, and, therefore, maintenance and upgrade costs will not decrease. All security and maintenance personnel would still be required for the remaining nuclear weapons.

USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator CRANSTON. There is a great deal of discussion over whether or not tactical nuclear weapons can be used without leading to what some people consider almost an inevitability that there is a swift escalation up to strategic nuclear weapons employment. What is your view of that personally?

General WEXAND. Well, I think that is a situation, or a scenario, again that I just cannot be very definite about because I think it is

going to continue to change. I have not thought through the total effect of nuclear parity or standoff, and certainly that would have a good deal to do with the results of using tactical nuclear weapons.

DANGEROUS POLICIES

I just think that the use of those kinds of weapons obviously entails very dangerous policies. We do not know right now where they would lead. We simply need to continue to study and analyze it. In the meantime, those systems provide a very powerful deterrent; we know that.

We know that the other side has them, and we want to maintain some sort of a balance with them. So that is the course that we are on now. But I really do not have a categorical answer to when would their use lead to escalation.

When you think of how the situation has changed with nuclear parity, would our actions in the crisis be the same now as they would have been in 1962 when we had overwhelming superiority? I just do not know.

I suppose that is the sort of thing that we have to think through. It is a very complicated situation. It is one that I believe the leadership of the Congress and the leadership of the executive branch need to continually discuss. It is the sort of thing, though, that I find in discussing it at the lower levels, usually to be counterproductive.

EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator CRANSTON. Are there any circumstances under which any one other than the Commander in Chief can make the final decision regarding employment of tactical nuclear weapons?

General WEYAND. No, sir.

Senator CRANSTON. The NATO allies do not have the capacity by themselves alone?

General WEYAND. No, sir.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. That is all I have.

General WEYAND. Sir, I probably spoke too soon. The French and the British have a nuclear capability, and I assume that they do have the capability to use their weapons unilaterally.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

NATO POSTURE DEFICIENCY

Senator HOLLINGS. Is it true, General, that in defense against an air attack, there is a major deficiency in the NATO posture in central Europe?

General WEYAND. I believe it is; yes.

PLANS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Senator HOLLINGS. What are the NATO plans for improving this situation that you could tell the committee?

ADEQUATE AIR DEFENSE

General WEYAND. Our plans, and we are one of the key parts of it, is to get ourselves an effective close-in anti-aircraft defense system. That is why we are moving out on the Roland, and now that has slipped a year. But in any event, we are moving strongly to get a capability better than we have for defending our forces on the ground. Then for the rear areas we have Improved Hawk, which is a very effective system, and we are continuing to improve that. The major issue beyond those two has to do with defense in the rear areas and defense against high altitude attack. That is the Nike Hercules. We are in the process of negotiating exchanges with our allies over there as to whether or not they would man some of those. Also whether or not we will then, at a point in time replace it with Sam-D which will be a much more capable system. We are probably 5 years or more off from putting together what I consider to be an adequate air defense, looking at it from the Army's standpoint.

Senator HOLLINGS. Senator Domenici.

LASER USE AS A DEFENSIVE WEAPON

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I am going to kind of depart from that subject, but I think it is within your domain. I have recently been somewhat concerned about some R. & D. efforts that are really futuristic that the Soviets could really take on with a kind of renewed emphasis or put all of their best scientists on. Let me give you an example. Let's talk about the use of laser in the military, by the military to use particularly as a defensive weapon.

MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH

It seems to me that as we try to plan especially for more than 1 year that there might be a serious risk involved in the military not having the scientific input to change directions quickly enough when a scientific breakthrough is made that has to be developed so it can be made operational. Staying with the laser again, we know it is a major new breakthrough and that the Soviets are doing a great deal in it.

Yet we have so many ongoing R. & D. programs that I am kind of concerned how we analyze the changing times with a long-term approach to put that in with a new thrust if we see it is necessary? What process takes place? Do you understand my concern?

I know we are going to cut that, but I do not think the House is going to cut the one I am speaking of. I do not know that they really cut it from the standpoint of saying we appreciate the Soviet effort and in spite of that we are cutting it, but rather in cutting an appropriations bill, maybe the intelligence relationship or the degree of long-term danger is not adequately realized.

Do you have any feeling for this? I think it is a mix of military and science to begin with. I know the Soviets have no trouble with

gathering up scientific resources and plugging them into a laser-type program. As you know they just take their greatest, and they have them on the program. How do you feel about whether we have the mechanism for evaluating that kind of thing?

R. & D. STRENGTHENING

General WEYAND. I feel fairly comfortable about the mechanism. I think a lot of the strengthening that the Congress had a part in over the years is the strengthening of the research and development effort and centralizing it at the Department of Defense level.

Now, of course Doctor Currie is there. I am allergic to stovepipe arrangements which come down deep into the Army. Yet, that is what we have in research and development, and so it is a protection against the concern that you have. That is, the possibility of this new system or new technology is recognized at that level, and certainly it is with respect to the laser: Its potential; the other side of its use in greatly increasing the accuracy and possibility of other conventional weapons; and then eventually the Beamrider which gives you a more accurate system than we have now with wire-guided missiles and so on; I think all that is recognized.

NOT SURPRISED BY ANY SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS

I think that you have to ask if the efforts overly fragmented so the money is not being put in the right squares within the laser development. That I do not know. As you know, one of the services has high-energy lasers and another has something else, which at this point in time they see will translate into the type of systems that service will be most interested in. But I do not think we have been surprised by any Soviet developments in that they have come up with something new. We have been surprised at the rate of their development from R. & D. into production. Interestingly enough, the Soviets think that we move quite readily from R. & D. into production, which surprised me, and I do not know as that applies to all Soviets.

Senator DOMENICI. Are we able to change gears quick enough based upon an extra emphasis on their end on this kind of highly scientific agenda?

KEEP AN ACCEPTABLE PERCENTAGE

General WEYAND. I think we are. I think the important thing is that we keep an acceptable percentage of our effort going into research, I think the programs are 6.1 and 6.2.

I think if we can keep that effort going—as you know, there are a lot of people who do not believe in spending a lot of money on research that does not lead anywhere—and it is true that a lot of it does not, but it is certainly a good hedge against surprise.

Senator DOMENICI. And when you have found a new technology that is of concern you do get the appropriate people in terms of that new totally different approach which might make a number of things we are working on archaic but we have to keep on them and start the other one?

MONEY FROM REPROGRAMING OR REORDERING PRIORITIES

General WEYAND. Yes, sir, and in fact the way it usually works out, they get my attention. Usually it turns out that it is someone or an agency that has been focused on that thing and they get the breakthrough; then they have come to me because they have to have the money and that money has to come from reprograming or re-ordering of priorities. That is the way it has worked in my experience.

Whether it is remotely piloted vehicles or laser or whatever, it has been that way, and I think that system works.

MULTIYEAR BUDGETING

Senator DOMENICI. If we go to multiyear budgeting you would hope that there would be this flexibility after getting the appropriate area that even if it was an add-on for this area that there would be a mechanism for listening to it, because you might have to do two or three archaic ones along with the new breakthrough one at the same time that there would still be that question of adding it on in lieu of making the services take it out of something they already need. That is one of the problems I see in the multiyear budget.

I assume you are aware that can be a very difficult budgeting problem for you all, but we will have to accommodate in some way and at least listen?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir, I agree with that.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

UNILATERAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator CRANSTON [presiding]. I have a couple of more questions. If the French and the British do have the unilateral capacity to make a first-use decision in employing nuclear weapons how does that affect our strategy of maintaining a conventional force in order to avoid the use of nuclear weapons?

General WEYAND. Sir, I do not believe it has affected our situation. We have as one of our foreign policy objectives the control of nuclear weapons and I am certain that our relations with the French and the British who are two of our allies are such that the unilateral use of nuclear weapons by either one of them is virtually unthinkable.

COSTS IN GENERAL

Senator CRANSTON. Just one general question on costs, how in your opinion can the 2-percent real annual growth in costs for Army personnel and the 4-percent procurement growth that the Army desires, together with the fact that the Air Force and the Navy also want real growth, how can all of that square with the President's desire to reduce the Federal budget?

General WEYAND. First of all, about the 2-percent growth, that was across the board and I did not mean, although obviously I left the impression, that I meant an increase in personnel, but I do not.

It is just costs. As a matter of fact, depending upon how that comes out, and we do not have the specifics of it, it does not square with it. But the degree to which it does not I do not know.

TRADEOFFS

There are all sorts of tradeoffs. It may be that particular emphasis will be given to our defense posture. If it is on strategic forces then, of course, the Army would feel an adverse impact from that. If a decision is made to go ahead at the expense of something else to try to maintain some continued improvement of our conventional position, we would probably get some modest cost growth. But I do not think for the time being we can look forward to anything like that 4 percent unless we make the force, in my case, smaller.

That again is a tradeoff. I think, sir, at least in my case, we are probably about 2 or 3 weeks premature for me to answer that question for you.

RISKS IN CUTTING DOWN

Senator CRANSTON. What specific risks would you see in making it smaller?

General WEYAND. I do not know. Again, I would have to know what we are talking about in specific terms before I would want to talk to you about risks. I think if we talked about it you would probably conclude, as I would, that one element would be how the program is viewed by the other side. Since we want to maintain equilibrium and stability, we would prefer not to do anything that would destabilize the situation that already is very touchy, whether it is worldwide or looking at these various regions. To what extent the other side would perceive cuts in our defense budget as a lessening of resolve, a greater willingness on our part to reach accommodations that are advantageous to them, you just do not know at this stage of the game.

I am talking this way because I personally am convinced that the executive branch has no intention of sending that kind of a signal. Now as to what risks we would take in cutting down, say, the force structure of the Army, again we do not know in the short term. Maybe in the long term we may end up just as we have in the three wars I have gone into where I have fought in Burma and China with grossly inadequate forces. In Korea we started out the same way; in Vietnam where everyone thought we had time to get ready and I took my division, an infantry division from Hawaii, over there in 1966, it was two-thirds of a division.

I had to organize the final third of that division after I went to Vietnam. So, even then, we were not ready. You just do not know what the price is you pay until the game begins. So a lot of it is a matter of judgment. I think what I would prefer to do, if you don't mind, is to wait until we get down to where you are dealing with specific programs and cuts and so forth, and then I think the Service Chiefs could give you a fairly realistic assessment.

Senator CRANSTON. The record will remain open for written questions that certain members wish to submit. On behalf of the committee, I want to thank you very much for being with us and for your direct-

ness and your responsiveness. We stand adjourned. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the chair.]

WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CRANSTON TO GENERAL WEYAND AND THE RESPONSES

NO LEGAL BASIS FOR PANAMANIAN PARTICIPATION

Question.—What is the legal basis—current or anticipated—for the Panama National Guard's participation in the U.S. defense force?

Answer.—There is no current legal basis for direct Panamanian participation in the U.S. defense force, nor is there any such participation. There is considerable liaison, coordination, and cooperation with Panamanian military authorities.

Under the proposed new Panama Canal treaty, there would be a more direct linkage between U.S. and Panamanian forces and the treaty would be the legal basis for it. One of the eight mutually agreed negotiating principles calls for Panamanian participation in the protection and defense of the canal [deleted].

PANAMANIANS MIGHT BE INVOLVED

Question.—How many Panamanians might be involved?

Answer.—The answer to your question depends on the treaty which is still being negotiated. But I would say that as we now view the concept of combined canal defense the entire Panamanian National Guard would be theoretically available to assist in Canal Defense.

COST TO U.S. GOVERNMENT

Question.—Would there be any cost to the U.S. Government? How much?

Answer.—Yes, there will be some cost to the U.S. Government. For FY 76, the security assistance program includes \$200,000 for grant materiel and \$400,000 for the Foreign Military Training Program. These planned expenditures are not a direct result of the combined defense concept, but they will contribute to it by continuing to upgrade the military capability of the Panamanian National Guard. Consideration is now being given to a recent Panamanian request for assistance in equipping a National Guard [deleted] suitable for canal defense. While no Foreign Military Sales Credits were requested for Panama in the FY 76 Congressional Presentation Document, it may be desirable to divert [deleted] in credits from the FY 76 program, when approved, to fund the [deleted].

Provided a new Panama Canal Treaty is negotiated and ratified, there will be an additional need in future years for a security assistance program to further upgrade the Panamanian capability to defend the Canal. The exact cost cannot be determined until specific treaty language is agreed upon and the necessary Panamanian force levels and structures have been determined. I would expect Foreign Military Sales Credits to be the major aspect of U.S. assistance.

NOT ANOTHER KOREA

Question.—Do you envisage a participation similar to the Republic of Korea's participation with the U.S. 2d Infantry Division in Korea?

Answer.—No. We do not plan any integration of U.S. and Panamanian troops [deleted].

NO USE OF U.S. FORCES TO QUELL DISORDERS

Question.—If Panamanian forces were integrated with U.S. forces, would there be any circumstances in which U.S. troops might be used to quell local disorders in Panama?

Answer.—First, the two forces will not be integrated [deleted]. I do not envision the use of U.S. forces to quell disorders except under circumstances in which a local disorder could threaten the canal, U.S. lives or property. I think the important point is that under the combined defense concept that will be less likely than it is under our current unilateral defense posture. The Panamanian canal defense forces would obviously be the indicated force to handle local disorders.

ARMY MAKES MOST OF CANAL

Question.—In the October 1975 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Stephen Rosenfeld stated, "The Army makes the most of the Canal. It operates the facility, administers the Zone and protects the whole package. Its Southern Command, some times known for its abundance of generals and golf courses as "Southern Comfort," clings to its support mission—largely training—of military programs throughout the hemisphere."

A. Show the total officer and enlisted strengths of the Army in the Canal Zone. (Include in the officer strengths the warrant officers, physicians, dentists, and officers funded from reserve and civil works appropriations).

B. How does this compare to the Army's overall officer and enlisted strengths? Please provide totals as well as percentages.

Answer.—A. There are less than 700 officers, approximately 100 warrant officers and over 6200 enlisted soldiers in the Army operating strengths in the Canal Zone as of the end October 1975.

B. The comparisons of Canal Zone and total Army operating strengths are :

	Canal Zone		Total Army	
	November	Percent	November	Percent
Officers.....	<700	-10	75,145	11.6
Warrant officers.....	>100	+1	11,980	1.8
Enlisted.....	6,200	+88	561,683	86.6
Total.....	7,000		648,803	

U.S. ARMY MISSION IN CANAL ZONE

Question.—What is the total mission of the U.S. Army in the Canal Zone?

Answer.—The U.S. Army forces in the Canal Zone are part of the Unified Command, U.S. Southern Command (U.S. SOUTHCOM). Under this Unified Command the Army forces are assigned the following missions: To coordinate and conduct the ground defense of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone against any hostile forces; to command and administer assigned U.S. Army forces in the Canal Zone; to operate the U.S. Army School of Americas; to provide logistical/administration support to assigned and tenant units, schools, other service components and U.S. SOUTHCOM; to provide support to U.S. Security Assistance Programs as coordinated with U.S. SOUTHCOM, and to support U.S. hemispheric missions and contingencies to include disaster relief and evacuation of noncombatants. The Army also conducts tropic testing, jungle warfare training, communications, mapping, medical research, meteorological and engineering activities in the Canal Zone, all of which are related to overall U.S. Army Missions.

TRAINING OF FOREIGN TROOPS

Question.—What foreign troops are we training now and planning to train in FY 76 and FY T. Please provide a breakdown by country and number. What is the cost to the U.S. Government for these training missions?

Answer.—The following tabulation depicts the number of foreign troops which were being trained by the U.S. Army in the Canal Zone as of 1 Dec. 75, the total number programed for FY 76 and the cost thereof to the U.S. Government.

Country	Number in training Dec. 1, 1975	Total programed fiscal year 1976	Total programed fiscal year T	Fiscal year 1976 dollar value
Argentina.....	1	20	-----	34,600
Bolivia.....	1	52	-----	276,400
Brazil.....	-----	6	-----	13,900
Colombia.....	11	290	-----	274,270
Dominican Republic.....	35	90	-----	349,500
Ecuador.....	31	64	-----	174,610
El Salvador.....	41	109	-----	223,640
Guatemala.....	12	57	-----	54,290
Honduras.....	32	83	-----	255,560
Mexico.....	-----	15	-----	10,300
Nicaragua.....	60	93	-----	190,233
Panama.....	17	155	-----	179,685
Paraguay.....	1	40	-----	104,060
Peru.....	2	196	-----	290,280
Uruguay.....	5	108	-----	165,330
Venezuela.....	16	34	-----	53,150
Total.....	265	1,412	1 350	2,649,808

¹ The firm fiscal year T input will not be known until Mar. 31, 1976 when the budget year training program of each country is finalized; however, it is anticipated that the input will be about equal to $\frac{1}{4}$ of the fiscal year 1976 total.

² Dollar values represent the cost to the U.S. Government under the fiscal year 1976 security assistance program. These funds defray student's travel and living allowances and the tuition of the training course. The tuition repays the school for all expenses except for pay of the assigned Army instructors and staff.

COST OF MAINTAINING U.S. ARMY IN CANAL ZONE

Question.—What is the estimated cost of maintaining and operating the U.S. Army in the Canal Zone? Include in your estimates all travel and moving costs for the approximate 10,000 military personnel, plus dependents and Zone support employees. Also include all pay, bonuses, and allowances? Please provide as detailed a breakdown of the total estimated costs as possible.

Answer.—The FY 1976 costs of Army operations in the Panama Canal Zone are approximately:

Appropriation:	Amount (millions)
Military personnel:	
Salaries and allowances.....	\$ 70.5
Travel and transportation.....	9.4
Subtotal	79.9
Operation and maintenance.....	41.1
Procurement	6.1
Military construction.....	6.0
Family housing:	
Construction	2.0
Operation and maintenance.....	7.0
Subtotal	9.0
Total	142.1

COMPARISON OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

Questions.—John Finney reported in the November 22 NY Times that a Major General draws \$54,713 a year in combined pay and benefits—\$13,465 more than a GS-18. The combined pay and benefits for a First Lieutenant reportedly total \$21,729—\$5,326 more than a comparable GS-8 or GS-9 in Civil Service. From Sergeant thru Major General military personnel are receiving from \$3,610 to \$13,465 more than comparable civilians. Why cannot substantial savings be achieved by civilianizing non-combat and stateside administrative, planning and support positions?

Answer.—The comparison of military and civilian compensation and benefits as reported in the NY Times gives the impression that the military member enjoys a significant advantage over civilian counterparts. Unfortunately, the Times did not include the qualifying statements that appeared in the Senate Committee on Appropriations (SAC) Report of the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, FY 1976. The SAC pointed out that the table comparing military and civilian compensation was not a statement of actual values, nor had an attempt been made to determine if work requirements were equal. Also, the special hardships of military life were not considered in determining the cost figures. The Senate Committee, as well as the Army, are aware that there are technical inconsistencies in the costing techniques used, as well as the complexity of comparing two different pay systems. The Army is attempting through information releases and by Congressional contact to correct any misconception of military compensation that may derive from the New York Times' report.

The Army recognizes that savings may sometimes be achieved by civilianizing positions in the military departments that do not require military incumbents. In recognition of certain advantages of civilianization, in particular cases, the Department of Defense initiated a civilian substitution program in the fourth quarter of FY 1973. Through 31 December 1975, the Army has converted over 14,000 military to civilian positions in support of this program. These positions were largely in the occupational areas of clerical and administration, supply and maintenance, motor transport, medical care and treatment, and food service. Further civilianization in significant numbers, however, cannot be absorbed within the existing force structure without creating a military-civilian position imbalance that will clearly inhibit military specialty skill development and reduce the number of military positions to a level below that essential to maintaining an adequate rotation and expansion base in support of a sixteen division force. Additionally, the Army cannot civilianize positions which require military incumbents by reason of law, security, maintenance of morale and discipline, combat readiness and training. For these reasons, the Army cannot now undertake another large-scale civilianization program.

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
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